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Stop Biting the Hand That Feeds Us:
Safeguarding Sustainable Development Through
the Application of NEPA's Environmental Impact
Statement to International Trade Agreements
"I look forward to the day when trade agreements are routinely matched by
closer environmental cooperation."'
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past half century, global levels of industrialization, economic
expansion, fossil fuel consumption and population have increased dra-
matically.2 These exponential growth patterns, experienced mainly by the
world's industrialized nations, were capitalized by the often reckless
exploitation of natural resources worldwide.' Many such resources were,
or are, on the verge of being irreparably damaged in the process due to
lack of management, planning and technology.4 The current ratio of cut
to planted trees, at ten to one in the tropics and twenty-nine to one in
Africa, illustrates the threatening rate at which we are consuming our
1. George Bush, The White House, (Jan. 1993), reprinted in 23rd Annual Report
on the Council of Environmental Quality 52 (1993) [hereinafter 23rd Annual Report].
But see George Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of
the Union (Jan. 28, 1992) (calling for less domestic regulation).
2. See Jim MacNeill, Strategies for Sustainable Economic Development: Balancing
Economic Growth and Ecological Capital, Sc. AM., Sept. 1989, at 154 (emphasizing
that economic development is negatively affected when the natural resources that
capitalize it are not replenished); see also Alan L Button, Prerequisite to Peace: An
International Environmental Ethos, 59 TENN. L REv. 681 (1992) (warning that failure
to sustain development results in political instability, which in turn threatens world
peace).
3. United States economic policies, for example, have traditionally favored in-
creased production of goods and GNP growth "at the expense of an eroding environ-
ment." Mobil Oil Corp. v. FrC, 430 F. Supp. 855,868 (1977).
4. See McNeill, supra note 2, at 154. Poor resource planning and management can
have dire consequences for even the mightiest countries, forcing them to reshape
their relations with other countries, and ultimately affecting national defense, the
trade deficit, and the competitiveness of other domestic industries. See, e.g., David
Hricik, The United States Copper Industry in the World Market: Running Hard Yet
Losing Ground, 8 J. INTL Bus. 686 (1988) (discussing the broad effects resulting
from the United States' failure to establish a national copper policy).
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environmental resources.' As a result of decades of careless develop-
ment practices, our generation is now confronted with the reality of irre-
versible environmental damage.'
The damage already caused has affected our global commons to such a
degree that it can no longer be ignored or unilaterally remedied.' At the
same time, the concept of free trade continues to spread throughout the
world, expanding existing markets, creating new ones, and, as a corol-
lary, placing greater demands on environmental resources than ever be-
fore.' Such demands cannot possibly be met without changing the way
we plan for and manage the life-support system common to every socio-
economic infrastructure: our environment.' Simply, current development
trends will soon be unsustainable unless nations begin cooperating to
mitigate the damage caused by such development through environmental
impact assessments, resource restoration and environmental rehabilita-
tion programs."
5. See McNeil, supra note 2, at 154; see also Peter Bunyard, World Climate and
Tropical Forest Destruction, 15 ECOLOGIST 125-26 (1985) (quoting Prime Minister of
France, Laurent Fabius, as stating that "[d]eforestation today is drought tomorrow and
famine the day after").
6. Russell E. Train, A Call For Sustainability: To Ensure Our Future Survival,
Major Changes Are Needed Now, EPA J., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 7 (suggesting that esti-
mated growth levels of economic activity in the United States and projected global
population over the next half-decade could be environmentally and economically di-
sastrous unless we take proper action immediately).
7. Obviously, local or regional actions cannot address problems like global warm-
ing alone. But see Joaquim Oliveira-Martins et al., The Economic Costs of Reducing
CO, Emissions, in OCED ECONOMIC STUDIES 123 OCED No. 19 (1992) (arguing that
even unilateral or regional action is still better than "business as usual"). The basic
problem with unilateral environmental policy-making is that it can be misinterpreted
as a non-tariff trade barrier (NTB). See infra notes 94-105 and accompanying text
(discussing the GAT'rs treatment of NTBs).
8. The destructive effect of current trade policies is obscured by an inherent flaw
in the internationally accepted system of economic accounting, which measures
countries' GNPs by "subtract[ing] the depreciation of plant and equipment from the
overall output of goods and services" but fails to account for depreciation of natural
capital, i.e. soil erosion, deforestation and ozone depletion. Lester R. Brown, A New
Era Unfolds, CHALLENGE, May-June 1993, at 37-38.
9. See, e.g., Capital Hill Hearing Before The Senate Energy and Natural Resourc-
es Committee (May 24, 1994) (testimony of Robert T. Watson, Associate Director For
Environment Office Science and Technology Policy) (presenting the potential adverse
effects of global warming on precipitation patterns, human health, ecological systems,
and socioeconomic sectors, and arguing for the development of new technologies).
Since 1993, Dr. Watson has testified before various House and Senate committees on
the serious magnitude and repercussions of the environmental problems. He testified
recently on October 6, 1994 to the House Subcommittee on Energy and Power. Capi-
tal Hill Hearing Before The Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee (Oct
6, 1994) (testimony of Dr. Robert T. Watson, Associate Director For Environment Of-
fice Science and Technology Policy).
10. The environment's ability to sustain any given population depends on the size
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Effective damage assessment must be made before potentially harmful
activities are undertaken, particularly in disciplines that have broad envi-
ronmental implications, such as international trade." Unfortunately,
trade negotiators, in general, traditionally ignore or exclude environmen-
tal concerns in the process of drafting international trade agreements. 2
But in today's global economy, the failure to incorporate environmental
provisions in trade talks could mean that all will have to face the nega-
tive consequences, rich and poor nations alike.3
In order to protect its own future economic prosperity, the United
States must develop policies that encourage less-developed nations, on
which we rely for critical resources, to achieve economic growth in an
environmentally-sound way."' This task must include a commitment to
continued enforcement and expansion of existing methods of evaluating,
planning, and approving actions that affect our environment.' 5 It must
include a renewed commitment to the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 (NEPA)."6
of the population, its per capita consumption, and the damage caused by the technol-
ogies used to satisfy each unit of consumption. See generally Gretchen C. Daily &
Paul R. Ehrlich, Population, Sustainability, and Earth's Carrying Capacity, 42 BiO-
SCIENCE 761 (1992).
11. Growing concern over the impact of international trade on the environment
made this the central issue at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. See
Kenneth Berlin & Jeffrey M. Lang, The New Trade Policy Agenda: Trade and the En-
vironment, 16 WASH. QrRLY. 35 (1993) (discussing the need to integrate trade and
environmental policies in order to address the rapid depletion of renewable resourc-
es).
12. The best example of trade negotiators' apathy towards the environment are the
current GATT' environmental rules, which can be described as rudimentary, at best.
See infra notes 88-92 (discussing GAT environmental measures).
13. See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text.
14. Despite recent efforts at the Rio Conference to develop some type of compre-
hensive liability and compensation policy system to address global environmental
problems, no such system exists today. See Agenda 21: Program of Action For Sus-
tainable Development, Rio de Janeiro, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26 (1992) [hereinafter
Agenda 21].
15. As previously discussed, unilateral measures in support of sustainable develop-
ment can raise considerable concerns in the trade community. See infra notes 94-105
and accompanying text (discussing NTBs); see also Edith Brown Weiss, Environment
And Trade As Partners In Sustainable Development, 86 AM. J. INT'L L 728 (1992)
(affirning that unilateral environmental measures might potentially be viewed as eco-
imperialistic practices). The United States can avoid this by entering into international
agreements that adopt its standards and procedures, especially where sufficient in-
ternational consensus exists over the benefits of implementing such measures. Id.
16. See Pub. L No. 91-19042, codified at U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1970). For a discus-
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NEPA, signed into law in 1970, was the first significant environmental
regulation enacted in the United States.'7 NEPA required all agencies of
the federal government to take into account the environmental conse-
quences of proposed or recommended actions by requiring prior prepara-
tion of an extensive report weighing the benefits of the project versus
the risk of damage to the environment. 8 Today, most U.S. federal
agencies incorporate NEPA's requirements into practice, and its concept
continues to spread abroad."
Ironically, while the European Community and other nations around
the globe are busy developing guidelines and regulations modeled after
NEPA, our environmental "Magna Carta," the Supreme Court, and the
executive branch of the United States continue to undermine the Act's
purpose by limiting its scope at home.' Congress intended the NEPA
process to result in agency actions that were less damaging to the envi-
ronment.' In fact, NEPA has made a significant contribution towards
sion of the early stages of NEPA history, see generally FREDERICK R. ANDERSON &
ROBERT H. DANIELs, NEPA IN THE COURTS (1973).
17. After NEPA, Congress launched a series of acts principally aimed at addressing
pollution-related problems. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1980); Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1976); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-
2629 (1976); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 et seq. (1974); Endangered
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq. (1973); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Ro-
denticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 135 et seq. (1972); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1972); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1970); see also
Jennifer Woodward, Turning Down the Heat: What United States Laws Can Do To
Help Ease Global Warming, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 203 (1989) (listing the 27 states that
have either partially or completely adopted NEPA's federal requirements to state
agency actions).
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1993).
19. See Arthur W. Murphy, The National Environmental Policy Act and the Li-
censing Process: Environmentalist Magna Carta or Agency Coup de Grace?, 72
COLUM. L. REV. 963 (1972) (describing NEPA as the most important environmental
statute).
20. See Michael C. Blumm, Introduction: The National Environmental Policy Act
At Twenty: A Preface, 20 ENvrL LAw 447, 449451 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme
Court's deference to agency decisionmaking and its view of NEPA as essentially pro-
cedural are reasons for NEPA's waning reputation at home, even as other countries
continue to adopt EIS legislation modeled after NEPA).
21. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 772
(1983). The legislative intent behind NEPA is instantly clear upon review of the fol-
lowing statements by two of NEPA's original proponents:
What is involved [in NEPA] is a congressional declaration that we do not in-
tend, as a government or as a people, to initiate actions which endanger the
continued existence or the health of mankind: That we will not intentionally
initiate actions which do irreparable damage to the air, land and water which
support life on earth.
115 Cong. Rec. 40416 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Jackson) (emphasis added).
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improving our environment by encouraging federal agencies to imple-
ment NEPA's procedural requirements, resulting in less litigation and
more environmentally-sound projects.' Notwithstanding NEPA's relative
success, courts have misconstrued NEPA's broad directives during the
past twenty-four years by ignoring its substantive provisions and purpose
and narrowly interpreting its application.' Supreme Court jurisprudence
reflects a particular lack of commitment to the Act by undermining the
legislative intent that should courts apply NEPA substantively.' The
Court's refusal to interpret NEPA substantively, combined with its equal-
ly restrictive view on standing under NEPA, results in a minimization of
the Act's impact and "deprives the nation of the full reach of Congress's
purpose in enacting the statute." '
The latest example of the judiciary's restrictive interpretation of NEPA
began on August 1, 1991, when several non-profit environmental groups
(Public Citizen) filed a lawsuit against the Office of the United States
Trade Representative (OTR), 2 alleging that the OTR violated NEPA's
procedural requirements by failing to provide an environmental impact
[We] can now move forward to preserve and enhance our air, aquatic, and
terrestrial environments . . . to carry out the policies and goals set forth in
the bill to provide each citizen of this great country a healthful environment.
Id. at 40924 (remarks of Rep. Dingell).
22. See SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINKm THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM (1984) (concluding that agency imple-
mentation of EIS requirement benefits actions by resulting in less expensive mitiga-
tion measures). The number of NEPA cases filed dropped from 189 in 1974 to 94 in
1991, while the number of environmental impact statements prepared by federal agen-
cies increased. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, TWENTY-TIRD CEQ
CUMULATIVE NEPA LITIGATION SURVEY (1992) [hereinafter CEQ Report].
23. See generally Nicholas C. Yost, Nepa's Promise-Partially Fufilled, 20 ENmVL
L 533 (1990).
24. Id. at 539-40.
25. Id. at 540; see also Annotation, Environmental And Conservation Groups'
Standing To Challenge Omission Or Adequacy Of Environmental Impact Statement
Required by § 102(2)(C) Of National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 USCS §
4332(2)(C)), 63 A.L.R. Fed. 446 (1983 & Supp. 1994); Annotation, Private
Individual's Standing to Challenge Omission or Adequacy of Environmental Impact
Statement Required by § 102(2)(C) Of National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(42 USCS § 4332(2)(C)), 62 A.LR. FED. 337 (1983 & Supp. 1994).
26. "The Trade Representative is responsible for conducting international trade
negotiations, developing and coordinating U.S. international trade policy, and imposing
retaliatory trade sanctions on other countries." Public Citizen v. Office of the United
States Trade Representative, 970 F.2d 916, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1992); 19 U.S.C. § 2171,
2411-2417 (1988).
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statement (EIS) in connection with the ongoing North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations.' The District Court granted
defendant's motion to dismiss the action on grounds that plaintiffs failed
to satisfy Article III standing or ripeness requirements.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia af-
firmed the district court's dismissal of the action, holding that the OTR's
failure to prepare an EIS for NAFTA was not judicially reviewable be-
cause OTR's preparation and submission of NAFTA to the President was
not a "final agency action" subject to NEPA's EIS requirement.' The
court of appeals based its decision on the preliminary determination that
the issue was not "judicially reviewable within the meaning of § 10(c) of
the Administrative Procedure Act." ' As a result, the court never reached
the substantive issue of the case: whether NEPA's EIS requirement ap-
plies to international trade agreements."
The purpose of this Comment is to challenge the legislature and judi-
ciary to take action to apply NEPA's EIS requirement to international
treaties and trade agreements. Part II examines the critical interdepen-
dency between the environment and development.' Part III critiques the
lack of environmental provisions in the existing international trade struc-
ture.' In addition, Part Ill discusses the growing need to include such
provisions in trade negotiations.' Part IV explores the language of exist-
ing international environmental agreements and their use of the environ-
mental impact assessment concept in their attempt to ensure future "sus-
tainable development."' Part V evaluates NEPA, its provisions, the
27. Public Citizen v. Office of United States Trade Representative, 782 F. Supp. 139
(D.C. 1992).
28. Id. at 144. Article III of the Constitution requires demonstration of an injury in
fact, traceable to the challenged action, and that a favorable determination is likely
to redress the injury. Id. at 141 (quoting Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)); Foundation
on Economic Trends v. Lang, 943 F.2d 79, 82 (D.C. Cir. 1991). For a general discus-
sion of a party's standing to sue for failure to prepare an EIS in accordance with
NEPA, see Annotation, Standing of Entity, Other Than Governmental or Environ-
mental Entity, To Challenge Omission or Adequacy of Environmental Impact State-
ment Required by § 102(2)(C) Of National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42
USCS § 4332(2)(C)), 61 A.LR. FED. 657 (1983 & Supp. 1994).
29. Public Citizen, 970 F.2d at 923.
30. Id. at 917. The pertinent text of the Administrative Procedure Act can be
found at 5 U.S.C. § 704.
31. Id. Interestingly, the court mentioned that notwithstanding the finality issue, it
was unclear whether a broad macroeconomic change, such as a trade agreement,
would trigger NEPA's EIS requirement. Id. at 921.
32. See infra notes 39-76 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 77-119 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 77-119 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 120-195 and accompanying text.
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Council on Environmental Quality, and the role of the courts as. primary,
although seemingly reluctant, enforcers of NEPA's EIS requirement over
the past twenty-four years.' Part VI argues for NEPA's application to
trade activity, critiquing the recent court of appeals holding that execu-
tive agency proposals to the President on international trade agreements
do not require preparation of an EIS.37 Finally, this author suggests
some changes that, if implemented, would encourage our administration
to lead the international trade community toward sustainable develop-
ment practices by negotiating trade agreements that are environmentally
sound and promote long-term economic growth for our trading partners
as well as for the United States.a
II. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
The threat of irreversible environmental damage has sparked a great
deal of public and political concern in the international community over
global warming, depletion of the ozone layer, desertification, deforesta-
tion, ocean contamination, and overpopulation.' Scientific data on the
36. See infra notes 196-285 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 286-340 and accompanying text.
38. See infra part VII.
39. "Sustainable development" gained international notoriety when the international-
ly influential Bruntland Commission used the term in its 1987 report. See WORLD
COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987). Accord-
ing to the report, "A world in which poverty and inequity are endemic will always be
prone to environmental and other crises. Sustainable development requires meeting
the basic needs of all and extending to all the opportunity to satisfy their aspirations
for a better life." Id. at 43-44. More specifically, "[s]ustainable development is devel-
opment that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of fu-
ture generations to meet their own needs." Id. at 44; see also Robert W. Hahn, To-
ward a New Environmental Paradigm, 102 YALE LJ. 1719, 1748-50 (1993) (reviewing
ALBERT GORE, JR., EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT (1992)).
40. See Economic Declaration Issued By Group of Seven Industrial Nations At
The Conclusion of Their Economic Summit in Houston on July 11 1990, 7 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 29, 1127 (July 18, 1990) [hereinafter Economic Declaration]
(calling for closer international cooperation in order to combat ozone depletion, de-
forestation, ocean pollution and other environmental challenges). The United States,
"transfixed" by the threat of Communism over the past several decades, is now be-
ginning to recognize the possibility of irreversible environmental damage, such as the
thinning ozone layer, as a threat to international security. Alice M. Rivlin, New Word,
New Dangers, WAsH. POST., April 10, 1990, at A23. See Hricik, supra note 4. For a
more in-depth discussion on the different environmental problems currently facing us,
see generally GARETH PORTER, & JANET W. BROWN, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS
(1991); AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT (1992).
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ozone problem alone indicates that "[slince 1967, the ozone layer over
the equator has decreased by 3%, [and] over Europe and North America
by 10%" and that "[elach 1% decrease can lead to a 3% to 6% increase in
skin cancer."' The depletion of the ozone layer exacerbates another
problem, global warming, which in addition to its potential for raising the
sea level and wiping out entire island groups, could have dire medical
consequences.42
The accuracy of scientific data regarding the actual effect of different
environmental problems is an area of much controversy, as opposite
sides present their own persuasive research.' While it is true that de-
grees of certainty and conclusiveness for different scientific data vary,
governments should not use this fact alone to justify inaction." The en-
vironmental problems the world faces may vary in degree, but they are
real and simply too critical to ignore.45
41. Donella Meadows, New Ozone Accord Is One Giant Step For Mankind; Envi-
ronment: Getting 93 Nations To Agree To Eliminate Chlorofluorocarbons Is A Near
Political Miracle; On To The Greenhouse Effect, LA. TIMES, July 8, 1990, at M2.
42. See Environmental Change Seen As Threat to Health, GREENWIRE, Dec. 15,
1993 (interviewing Dr. Eric Chivian). Doctor Eric Chivian, a Nobel laureate psychiatry
professor at Harvard Medical School, explains that data on global warming indicate
that increased temperatures would result in higher mortality rates for the elderly and
the chronically sick as well as more rampant spread of diseases typically carried by
mosquitos and ticks. See id. But see Malcolm Ritter, Arctic Temperatures Show
Flaws in Global-Warming Projections, Study Says, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 28,
1993.
43. See, e.g., Janet Fairchild, Annotation, VALIDrrY AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES
REGULATING STRIP MINING, 86 AL.R. 3d 27 (1978 & Supp. 1994) (discussing the diffi-
culty of attacking strip-mining regulation in light of the volumes of scientific data on
the damages caused by the practice). On the international level, international scien-
tific cooperation has yielded increasingly convincing evidence that is beginning to
make its way to regulatory decision-makers. Implications of the Findings of the Ex-
pedition to Investigate the Ozone Hole over the Antarctic: Joint Hearing on S. 385
Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Protection and the Subcomm. on Hazardous
Wastes and Toxic Substances of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public
Works, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1987) (conclusively establishing a link between
atmospheric chlorine accumulation and ozone-depletion); see also Peter H. Sand, Les-
sons Learned In Global Environmental Governance, 18 B. C. ENVrL. AFF. L REv. 213,
214-16 (1991) (noting that the most recent ice-core data of carbon dioxide in Antarc-
tica reveal a steep upward trend in the last few decades). The accumulation and
review of expert data, like carbon dioxide findings in Antarctica, is critical in formu-
lating a valid base for future governmental action. Id. at 214-17.
44. See Economic Declaration, supra note 40, 29 at 1127 (acknowledgment by
leaders of the industrialized nations that the threat of irreversible environmental dam-
age demands action regardless of "scientific certainty" of such damage and declaring
responsibility for passing on a healthy environment to future generations).
45. See Joel Yellin, Science, Technology, and Administrative Government: Institu-
tional Designs for Environmental Decisionmaking, 92 YALE LJ. 1300, 1315-17 (1983)
(arguing that the judiciary "may properly reach a considered judgment that a court
1096
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A. Public Involvement: A Necessary Precursor to Political Action
Any commitment toward resolving global environmental problems
must include public participation to ensure a fair process and to guar-
antee that risks to our environment have been eliminated or, at the very
least, minimized.46 The public's moral outrage over environmental disas-
ters seems to function as a catalyst for change in the field of environ-
mental law.47 To that end, "[s]cientific data and the verification of the
environmental theories they make possible must be accessible to the gen-
eral public and disseminated widely to have a chance of political
efficacy."' Government and industry are typically unwilling to pass cost-
ly environmental laws if left free from public political pressure.'
Public awareness of environmentally sensitive projects and their effect
on the environment results in the mobilization of interest groups that in
turn can pressure politicians into action, as was the case when President
Bush moved toward restricting chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) emissions
thought to be destroying the ozone layer.' Arguably, the studies and
should, even unaided, take the inferential leap from scientific argument to legal con-
ception," thereby sharing the responsibility for dealing with environmental problems
traditionally assigned solely to administrative policymakers).
46. "Governments should collect and maintain full and accurate environmental in-
formation necessary for the formulation and implementation of environmental policy,
and citizens and public officials should have appropriate access to such information."
THE 1991 BELLAGIO CONFERENCE ON U.S.-U.S.S.R. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION INSTITU-
TION: THE BELLAGIO DECLARATION ON THE ENVIRONMENT, 19 B. C. ENVTL AFF. L REV.
499, 499-500 (1992); see also Philip H. Meyers, Annotation, Construction and Applica-
tion of §§ 101-105 of National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 USCS §§
4331-4335) Requiring All Federal Agencies to Consider Environmental Factors in
Their Planning and Decisionmaking, 17 A.L.R. FED. 33, § 2(b) (setting forth the
extent of the public's right to timely information regarding programs that significantly
affect the environment).
47. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J.
1196, 1217-19 (1977) (recognizing the public's moral outrage as a catalyst for environ-
mental reform).
48. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Earth As Eggshell Victim: A Global Perspective on
Domestic Regulation, 102 YALE LJ. 2107, 2115 (1993).
49. Traditional economic notions of risk-based analysis often lead government and
industry to defer implementation of costly regulation geared toward resolving highly
disputed future risks. For an excellent comparison of the risk-based, cool analysis
versus the moral outrage approach, see Christopher H. Schroeder, Cool Analysis Ver-
sus Moral Outrage In The Development Of Federal Environmental Criminal Law, 35
WM. & MARY L REV. 251 (1993).
50. See Reconciliation Bill Likely To Include Environmental Taxes, Hill Aides Tell
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regulations passed by the Reagan and Bush administrations with respect
to CFCs occurred because of public pressure and environmental groups'
lobbying efforts."
President Bush's agreement to restrict CFCs also preceded the United
Nations' recognition of a growing international sentiment that immediate
international cooperation was necessary to prevent further global envi-
ronmental deterioration.' Before the 1992 World Environmental Confer-
ence in Rio de Janeiro, a United Nations negotiating conunittee suggest-
ed a proposal for reducing carbon dioxide emissions and other "heat-
trapping" gases in an attempt to force the issue of global warming at the
upcoming conference.'
Public pressure also played a large role in shaping international envi-
ronmental policy in Europe, where the European Community (EC)' in-
troduced new legal guidelines on environmental impact assessments.'
The Single European Act of 1986' elevated environmental protection in
Europe to constitutional levels by providing comprehensive environmen-
ABA, 21 EwNVrL. REP. (BNA) 152 (1990); Seth Cagin & Philip Dray, Are the Greens
Turning Yellow? N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1993, at A23; Michael Wesskopf, Bush Offers
Clean Air Compromise: Democrats Call Letter a Ploy to Insulate President from
Critics, WASH. POST, Sept 27, 1990, at A14.
51. See Rita Beamish, Bush Makes Election-Year Turnaround on Ozone-Depleting
Chemicals, THE ASSOC. PRESS, Feb. 12, 1992; see also Michael Weisskopf, US. May
Seek to Hasten Action to Protect Ozone; Signs of Atmospheric Damage Alarm Offi-
cials, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1992, at A3 (noting the Bush administration's increasing
attention to the CFC problem "only after initial resistance"). For an argument that the
public and environmental organizations should be granted standing to enjoin federal
actions if they are denied information about the environmental effects of such action,
see generally Lawrence Gerschwer, Note, Informational Standing Under Nepa: Jus-
ticiability And The Environmental Decisionmaking Process, 93 COLUM. L REV. 996
(1993) (defending informational standing to challenge agency actions under NEPA).
52. See William K Stevens, Compromise Offered at U.N. On Greenhouse Emis-
sions, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1992, at 3.
53. Id. The proposal was in response to grim scientific predictions that the tem-
perature of the Earth's atmosphere will inevitably rise within the next century if the
current emissions levels continue unchecked, resulting in catastrophic consequences
to the global ecosystem. Id.; 1 UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN STRATOSPHERIC
OZONE AND GLOBAL CLIMATE 257 (J. Titus, ed. 1986) (providing an overview of the
effects of global change on the planet).
54. See generally Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958), as amended by Single European Act, 1987 O.J. L 1969/1
(1987) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
55. See Analysis And Perspective: European Community Waste Policy: At The
Brink Of a New Era., 14 INT'L ENvTI. REP. (BNA) 403 (July 17, 1991).
56. 1987 O.J. L 1969/1 (1987), reprinted in 25 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 506 (1986).
See also infra notes 179-191 and accompanying text (discussing the European
Community's approach to environmental problems).
1098
[Vol. 22: 1089, 19951 Stop Biting the Hand That Feeds Us
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
tal policies that granted the EC power to "impose binding obligations on
sovereign nation states."57 This type of international environmental reg-
ulation is unprecedented. A more recent chapter in the Single European
Act explicitly covers "environmental protection measures, such as air and
water quality and assessment procedures for new industrial facilities."'
This type of inter-governmental cooperation with respect to environmen-
tal concerns represents a workable model for implementation of environ-
mental regulation by current NAFrA members.'
The EC's activities to protect the environment evince a trend in the
Nineties toward a more environmentally conscious world in which gov-
ernment leaders, industry, employers, and investors are playing catch-up
to the increasingly "green" demands of people everywhere.'
B. The Paradox Of Harmonizing Economic Development and
Environmental Concerns
The increasing "green" demands for global and regional environmental
solutions can no longer be met through unilateral action, but instead
require international cooperation." Such cooperation is difficult to
achieve within the framework of current international trade schemes,
57. George A. Bermann, The Single European Act: A New Constitution for the
Community?, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L 529 (1989) (discussing the Single European
Act); see also European Environmental Policy: Effects of the Single Market, 16 INT'L
ENVTL REP. (BNA) 30 (Jan. 13, 1993) (listing the Single European Act of 1986, in-
creased public pressure, and the emergence of environmental groups as reasons for
the EC's more active role in passing environmental legislation).
58. European Environmental Policy, supra note 57, at 30; see also infra note 182
and accompanying text. The Single European Act provided major environmental pro-
cedures by amending the existing Treaty of Rome, the treaty establishing the Europe-
an Economic Community. See EEC Treaty, supra note 54, pt. 1, art 3. For a more in-
depth discussion of the Single European Act's environmental provisions, see Ludwig
Kraemer, The Single European Act and Environment Protection: Reflections on Sever-
al New Provisions in Community Law, 24 COMMON MKT. L REV. 659 (1987).
59. See supra notes 179-91 and accompanying text.
60. Peter A. A. Berle, A Healthy Environment And A Healthy Economy Can Go
Hand-in-Hand; How Green is Green?: International Environmental Groups Debate
the Wisdom of Partnerships With Business, INT'L AsS'N OF Bus. COMM., April 1992, at
27. "Against this 'green' consumer, employment, and investor background, it is clear
that it is not a matter of if the world goes to a basis of environmentally sustainable
economic development, it is a matter of when." Id.
61. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
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particularly because wide economic gaps between industrialized and
developing countries result in different outlooks and priorities with re-
spect to environmental concerns."
It is imperative that developing nations industrialize in order to sustain
the needs of their growing populations and shoulder their share of re-
sponsibility for our global environment." But for many developing coun-
tries, the need to industrialize is great while their budgets are small."
Some countries plainly lack the money necessary to study and assess
environmental challenges and implement environmentally sound solu-
tions.' Malaysia, for example, has no industry to speak of except tim-
ber, making it highly dependent on the exploitation of this resource.' In
the absence of technological help from industrialized nations, Malaysia,
and many nations like it, must choose between starving or logging.'7
62. See Cliff Haas, Welistone Raising His Voice On The Environmen, STAR TRIM,
May 31, 1992, at 12A. Prior to his trip to Rio de Janeiro as a Senate observer at the
Earth Summit, United States Senator Paul Wellstone stated that "other nations, espe-
cially in the Third World, are reluctant to sacrifice economical development for envi-
ronmental purposes unless they see the United States demonstrate a willingness to do
that." Id.
63. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 531 (1991) (citing the developing
countries' inability to pay for environmentally sound economic development as major
challenge to the development of international environmental law).
64. Id.
65. Most developing countries' monetary problems are exacerbated by the accumu-
lating interest on debts still owed to commercial banks since the 1970s. See Marilyn
Post, Comment, The Debt-for-Nature Swap: A Long-Term Investment for the Econom-
ic Stability of Less Developed Countries, 24 INT'L LAW 1071, 1072 (1990) (pointing to
a 40% price increase by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
as the principal reason for the current external debt crisis experienced by developing
countries).
66. See D.S. Mahathir Mohamed, Poor Nations Alone Can't Save The Environmen
THE HOUSTON CHRON., June 3, 1992, at A25. "Unfortunately, quick-fix solutions, such
as clearing forests for farming, mining, and lumber, pillage tropical rainforests,
wetlands, and grasslands, and produce emasculating effects on this ecologically vital
corner of the world." Id. at 486; see Priya Alagiri, Comment, Give Us Sovereignty Or
Give Us Debt: Debtor Countries' Perspective On Debt-For-Nature Swaps, 41 AM. U. L
REv. 485 (1992).
67. Creditor nations have begun implementing nature-for-debt swaps in an effort to
discourage poorer nations from clear-cutting the few remaining tropical forests in the
world. See The International Development in Finance Act of 1989 §§ 512, 521, Pub. L
No. 101-240, §§ 12, 521 reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2492; Moran, Debt-for-Nature
Swaps: U.S. Policy Issues and Options, RENEWABLE RESOURCES J., Spring 1991, at 20-
22; A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Law: The Role of Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions In The Development of International Environmental Law, 68 CHI.-KENT. L REv.
61, 74-75 (1992) (discussing non-governmental organizations' participation in the na-
ture-for-debt swap process). Through these programs, some developing countries have
been able to parlay the rest of the world's concern over precious shrinking resources
into financial and technical assistance. See Alagiri, supra note 66, at 486-88.
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This is not to say that developing countries do not care about the envi-
ronment. However, they do not feel their forests should be locked up to
help pay for the "ecological sins [of industrialized countries] committed
on the[ir] road to prosperity."'
In the past, industrialized nations limited the scope of their environ-
mental agendas to domestic policy-making.' This state of affairs is rap-
idly changing as industrialized nations realize that ignoring environmental
degradation abroad could mean future destabilization of their own eco-
nomic infrastructures.' But existing high-consumption societies, led by
the United States, still demand a continuous supply of rapidly depleting
global natural resources.7' Considering the effects that trade liberaliza-
tion, in terms of the strain that high-population countries like China will
cause once they reach U.S. levels of consumption, can the earth keep up
with such demands?7' It is true that political choices to protect the glob-
al environment can mean short-term economic slowdown of industries
that either pollute or are highly dependent upon natural resources.'
Such hard choices are made even tougher when implementation could
require changes in public consumption habits. But if governments wait
68. See Mohamed, supra note 66, at A25.
69. Under United States law, for example, it is well settled that domestic legisla-
tion will not be applied extra-territorially absent a clear legislative intent to do so.
Congress' primary concern for actions within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States versus conduct abroad reflects the broad doctrine of territorial sovereignty.
Julienne I. Adler, Comment, United States' Waste Export Control Program: Burying
Our Neighbors In Garbage, 40 Am. U. L. REV. 885 (1991); see also U.N. CHARTER art.
2, 1 (setting forth the principle of sovereign equality).
70. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
71. The United States, representing 6% of the world's population, consumes 30% of
the world's mineral production. G. Kevin Jones, United States Dependence on Imports
of Four Strategic and Critical Minerals: Implications and Policy Alternatives, 15
B.C. L REV. 217, 220 § 2 & n.21 (1988) (discussing mineral import dependency and
vulnerability issues). The United States also consumes 25% of the world's energy and
emits 2296 of all carbon dioxide produced. Dr. Ranee Khooshie Lal Panjabi, Can In-
ternational Law Improve the Climate? An Analysis of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change Signed at the-Rio Summit in 1992, 18
N.C. J. INT'L L & Com. REG. 491, 509 (1993).
72. For an answer to this question that is a cautious yes, see generally MacNeill,
supra note 2, at 154.
73. Furthermore, protection of global commons may encounter resistance from
developing countries interested more in economic growth than environmental quality.
Patrick Low, Trade and the Environment: What Worries the Developing Countries?,
23 ENvTL. L 705, 706 (1992).
74. AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE 349-52 (1992) (describing several proposals to
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until the scientific community can support their grim predictions with
100% accuracy, will it then be too late?
The seemingly paradoxical situation is that, while industrialization
provides the monetary and technological resources necessary for imple-
mentation of costly environmental measures, it also increases the de-
mand for shrinking natural resources and creates exceedingly high levels
of worldwide pollution. 5 Ironically, industrialized nations are asking
developing nations to achieve what they themselves failed to do: imple-
ment economic growth strategies that minimize adverse environmental
effects. However, industrialized nations cannot continue their gluttonous
consumption of global non-renewable resources, such as fossil fuel, and
expect developing countries to forego industrialization.76
The challenge of harmonizing economic development with the environ-
ment calls not only for innovation and cooperation, but for a reassess-
ment of existing international structures that disregard the inescapable
conclusion that economic development and the environment are inextri-
cably linked together.
III. THE GAT
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)" governs inter-
national trade among nations."h Founded after World War II, in 1947, the
combat pollution and other environmental evils).
75. On one hand, "the pursuit of high rates of economic growth may, depending
on the economic characteristics of the economy, cause faster-than-sustainable rates of
depletion of natural resources and increased water emissions and energy use - a key
factor underlying air pollution. On the other hand, rapid economic growth can gener-
ate the resources by which a government can finance environmental protection poli-
cies." Kenneth Miranda & Timothy R. Muzondo, Governments Must Consider the Pos-
sible Impacts of Their Environmental Policies on Key Macroeconomic Balances, 28
FIN. & DEV. 2, 25 (1991).
76. 135 CONG. REC. H6836 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1989) (statement of Rep. Studds).
Comments by Congressmen that "leadership must begin at home" underline their
observations that the United States is by far "the world's largest generator of the
emissions that cause global warming . .. the largest user of the CFC's that deplete
the layer's ozone" and "the world's largest consumer of fossil fuels." Id.
77. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GAIT). For a history of GATT, see S. GOLT,
THE GA77 NEGOTIATIONS 1986-90: ORIGINS, ISSUES, AND PROSPECTS (1988); ROBERT E.
HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMAcY (2nd. ed. 1990).
78. For general background information on GAIT, see KENNETH W. ABBOTT, BAsic
DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS
AND TRADE (GATT), 1 B.D.I.E.L 3 (1990) available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library, BDIEH
file; REINHARD RODE, GATT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMEN. A TRANSATLANTIC STRATEGY
FOR A STRONGER REGIME (1990) (criticizing GATT members as "egocentric actors" and
arguing that new solutions involving the three developing trade blocks (North Ameri-
ca, Europe, and Asia) are imperative in order to preserve free trade); JOHN H. JACK-
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Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade was originally part of a more ambitious project: the formation
of the International Trade Organization (1TO).' ITO's role would have
been the economic equivalent to the United Nations Security Council, as
enforcer of the GATT rules, but disagreement among the member nations
prevented the formation of the organization, leaving GATT disputes to be
arbitrated by dispute panels that have no power to enforce their deci-
sions.'
It has been suggested that the modem formation of an ITO-like Multi-
lateral Trade Organization (MTO) "might be better equipped than the
GATT to deal with a global economy which now has financial and eco-
logical aspects that the original GATT signatories in 1947 could never
have dreamed of."'1 Although formation of the ITO never materialized,
wide post-war sentiment against protectionism and in favor of interna-
tional cooperation resulted in the GATT.' Since its creation, the GA7r
has grown from twenty-three to over 100 nations, has undergone more
than eight rounds of negotiations, the last of which took seven years to
conclude, and has drastically altered the economic relations between
member and non-member nations alike.'
An oversimplified view of the GATT reveals two main principles at the
heart of the agreement: (1) the principle of "most-favored nations," re-
quiring GATT members to treat each other equally and (2) the notion of
customs duties, or import tariffs, as the only accepted method of protect-
SON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATr SYSTEM (1990) (examining the "institutional" and "con-
stitutional" structures of GATT).
79. Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: To-
ward a New Multilateralism, 76 IoWA L REV. 273, 298 (1991).
80. See What's a GATT?, THE PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 15, 1993, at 15A (discussing the
set-up of penalties at the Uruguay Round in an attempt to improve the inadequate
enforcement provisions of the GATT). For details on GATrs dispute settlement pro-
cedure, see Improvement to the GATT Dispute Steelement Rules and Procedures in
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Decisions Adopted At the Midterm Review
of the Uruguay Round, Apr. 8, 1989, 28 LLM. 1023, 1031 (1989).
81. See Europe And America; The Figleaf Hunt, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 1993, at
62.
82. See What Is GA)T? Here Are Questions And Answers, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Dec. 15, 1993, at 4A.
83. Id, "[Alverage tariffs imposed by industrialized countries have fallen from more
than 40 percent to less than 5 percent, while the value of world merchandise exports
has skyrocketed from $ 50-billion to $ 3.7-trillion." Id.
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ing domestic industries.' A detailed evaluation of the economic provi-
sions of the GATT is beyond the scope of this Comment.'
Problems addressed during the Uruguay Round of the latest GATT
talks included adjustments to account for the slowdown of economic
growth during the last two decades, the increased utilization of subsidies
and other non-tariff barriers (NTBs) by countries attempting to protect
domestic producers, and areas of international trade that remain unregu-
lated by the GATT, such as services, intellectual property, and agricul-
ture.' The failure to incorporate provisions addressing the emerging list
of global environmental issues in the Uruguay Round has caused delays
and disa~greements as well as disillusionment. The end result being a
GATT that, at best, inadequately addresses global environmental prob-
lems such as the depletion of natural resources.'
The GATT rules pertaining to the environment are contained in a sin-
gle paragraph describing the limitations on the use of technical regula-
tions or standards.' If there is an international technical standard on
point, GATT members are to adhere by it "except where, as duly ex-
plained upon request, such international standards or relevant parts are
inappropriate for the [p]arties concerned, for... reasons [such] as...
protection for human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or
the environment."' This general exemption allowing justified domestic
environmental standards is vague and unclear.'
84. Id.
85. For further reference material, see supra notes 77-78.
86. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991). For the final act of
the Uruguay Round of GATI' talks, see Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uru-
guay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993),
reprinted in 33 LLM. 1 (1994).
87. Howard LaFranchi, What's Next for World Trade?, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MON-
rroR, Dec. 23, 1993, at 6 (citing United States chief trade negotiator Mickey Kantor as
saying that environmental issues must be included in future GATT talks, and that an
environmental work program is already prepared and waiting for approval by trade
ministers).
88. See GATT, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX, 61 Stat. A3, A60, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194, 262 (providing rules for application of non-discriminatory domestic regu-
lations); see also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Technical Barriers to
Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, art. 2.2, 31 U.S.T. 405, T.I.A.S. No. 9616, reprinted in 18 I.LM.
1079, 1083 (1979) (GAT Standards Code in force since Jan. 1, 1980 Tokyo round of
the talks).
89. Id.
90. Environmentally vague standards undermine domestic environmental policies in
the United States. See generally Kurt C. Hofgard, Trade And The Environment: Is
This Land Really Our Land?: Impacts of Free Trade Agreements On U.S. Environ-
mental Protection, 23 ENVTL. L. 635, 664 (1992).
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There are two basic problems with the GATT environmental provi-
sions. First, notwithstanding the language in the above paragraph, at-
tempts at restricting imports in response to domestic environmental
policies have been found to be unacceptable NTBs in violation of the
GATT Second, the GATT does not explicitly incorporate any of the
numerous international agreements on the environment into its frame-
work.'
A. The GATTs Current Treatment of Environmental Standards;
NTBs in Violation of Free Trade
One problem identified with the GATTs position of restricting NTBs
while allowing exemptions for environmental regulation is the lack of
proper criteria for differentiating between environmentally protective
trade restrictions and NTBs.' A recent example of a legitimate environ-
mental concern found to be an NTB is the GATT panel report on United
States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna.'
In August of 1990, the United States imposed a temporary import em-
bargo on yellowfm tuna products and yellowfin tuna harvested with
purse-seine nets in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean until it could de-
termine whether the exporting countries were complying with standards
set by the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA).' The purpose of the
MMPA was to reduce dolphin mortality rates occurring as an incidental
result of the use of purse-seine netting and driftnet fishing techniques
91. See infra notes 93-103 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
93. See ifura notes 104-12 and accompanying text.
94. See Report of the Panel, United States, Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT
Doc. D/S21/R (Sept. 3, 1991); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Set-
tlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 IL.M.
1594 (1991). For a general critique of the GAT provisions in light of the tu-
na/dolphin decision, see Matthew Hunter Hurlock, Note, The GATT, U.S. Law And
The Environment: A Proposal To Amend The Gatt In Light Of The Tuna/Dolphin De-
cision, 92 COLUM. L REV. 2098 (1992).
95. See generally Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407
(1972) [hereinafter MMPA]. For general information on the MMPA, see Michael A.
DiSabatino, Annotation, Validity, Construction, And Application Of Endangered Spe-
ciaes Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C.S. §§ 1531-1543), 32 A.L.R. FED. 332 (1994). For further
information on the applicability of the Act's provisions to actions in foreign countries,
see Ethel R. Alston, Annotation, Construction And Application Of Marine Mammal
Protection Act of 1972 (16 USCS §§ 1361 et seq.) And Administrative Regulations
Promulgated Thereunder, 43 A.LR. FED. 599, § 8(b) (1994).
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used in harvesting tuna.' Section 1371(a)(2)(C) of the Act required in-
termediary nations exporting yellowfin tuna to the United States to "pro-
vide reasonable proof that [they have] acted to prohibit the importation
of such tuna and tuna products from any nation from which direct ex-
port to the United States of such tuna and tuna products is banned un-
der this section."'
Mexico requested a GATT panel to review the MMPA import prohibi-
tions to determine, among other issues, whether such prohibitions were
inconsistent with Article XI and Article XIII of the GATT.' The GATT
panel found the import prohibitions, and the provisions of the MMPA
under which the United States imposed them, contrary to Article XI and
XX of the GATT.' The panel reasoned that the MMPA prohibition re-
sulted in an unfair benefit to the United States tuna fleet that already
adopted alternative techniques to comply with the MMPA.
The panel also reasoned that to the extent to which the parties were
free to supplement or waive the General Tariff provisions by agreement,
the panel's report would not affect "the rights of individual contracting
parties to pursue their internal environmental policies and to co-operate
with one another in harmonizing such policies, nor the right of the [con-
tracting parties] acting jointly to address international environmental
problems which can only be resolved through measures in conflict with
the present rules." '° Interestingly, the GATT panel itself admittedly rec-
ognized the inconsistencies that exist between the goal of environmental
preservation and the current GATT trade policy.
GATT restricts the use of technical standards, including environmental
protection standards. On the other hand, GATT encourages parties seek-
ing to give their environmental policies effect to enter into bilateral
agreements that amend the GATr provisions as between them or, alter-
natively, waive the GATT requirements altogether.' If the parties can-
not agree to more elevated standards by amendment or waiver, their
96. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (West Supp. 1994).
97. Id. § 1371(a)(2)(c).
98. See United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the GAIr Panel
(Aug. 16, 1991), reprinted in 30 IL.M. 1594, 1624 (1991). Article XI of the GATT in-
cludes a general prohibition of quantitative restrictions while Article XIII prohibits the
establishment of "discriminatory conditions for a specific geographical area." Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. This is precisely what the GATT panel reviewing the United States restrictions
on tuna suggested. See Galt Dispute Settlement Panel Report: United States-Restric-
tions On Imports Of Tuna, 1993 Am. SOc'Y. OF INT'L L BAsic DOCUMENTS OF INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 1, available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library BDIEL File (1991)
(containing the text of the tuna/dolphin case).
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domestic environmental protection standards must defer to accepted
international standards or risk being deemed NTBs in violation of the
GATT.1Iu
Which international environmental agreements control as accepted
international standards? GATT does not expressly adopt any of them.
Certainly, GATT's endorsement of a list of accepted international envi-
ronmental agreements would go far in resolving this mystery. With the
tuna/dolphin case, the United States experienced firsthand the uncertain-
ty the current GAT rules create with respect to environmental provi-
sions affecting international economic activity.' 4 According to some,
NAFTA is a step toward resolving this uncertainty, at least on a regional
level."
B. A Preview of the Next GA7T Round; Environmental Reform Will
Likely Take Center Stage
After the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT talks," ob-
servers disagreed about what the talks accomplished and what still re-
mains to be done. 7 Some considered that the Uruguay Round did not
go far enough in removing perceived obstacles to free trade."
According to some observers, the only clear winners after the Uruguay
GAIT talks are the industrial countries and their multinational compa-
103. For a general discussion on the conflict between the GATT rules and environ-
mental regulation, see Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Trade And Environment: Free Inter-
national Trade And Protection Of The Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 AM.
J. INT'L L 700 (1992).
104. See Michael B. Froman, Recent Developments Note, The United States-Euro-
pean Community Hormone Treated Beef Conflict, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 549 (1989) (dis-
cussing the United States-European Community dispute over the importation of hor-
mone-treated beef).
105. See infra notes 112-19, 159-60 and accompanying text.
106. Keith M. Rockwell, Largest Trade Pact In History Completed, J. OF COMMERCE,
Dec. 16, 1993, at Al (claiming Uruguay Round is the biggest trade pact yet and the
first GAIT round to include agricultural, textile, and patent provisions).
107. See GATI' Delegates Debate the Inclusion of Labor Standards in the Next
GAP)' Round, INT'L TRADE DAILY, Jan. 25, 1994 (available in WESTLAW, BNA-BTD
Database) [hereinafter GA7TI" Delegates Debate].
108. See Kan Seng, Gatt Accord Doesn't Remove All Trade Barriers, BUSINESS TIMES
(Singapore desk), Jan. 15, 1994, at 2. In Singapore, Home Affairs Minister Wong Kan
Seng expressed that although the latest GATT round successfully removed the "most
blatant protectionist measures, other invidious barriers will continue to block the path
towards closer global economic integration." Id.
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nies.'" Others stress that "'social clauses' such as human rights and en-
vironmental issues" are barriers that continue to stand in the way of free
trade."' Certain developing countries view environmental concerns as
disguised protectionist attempts by industrialized countries to keep re-
source-rich nations from developing."'
But existing inequities among trading countries should not be used as
an excuse for postponing environmental reforms to the GATT that could
improve global health. Current differences in opinion only serve to rein-
force the fact that the issue of trade and the environment will, most
likely control the next GATT talks."2
In the United States, legislators on Capitol Hill were divided over the
issue of including environmental reforms in the next talks."' The
Clinton administration supported the idea of future environmental re-
forms to the GATT, stating that in the meantime it was "prepared to be
firm" by using unilateral trade sanctions on countries that harm the envi-
ronment."4 The inclusion of international environmental standards in
the recently concluded NAFTA provision lent credibility to the
109. See Kevin Watkins, Under GAT Deal, The Poor Will Be Even Poorer, THE
MoNTREAL GAzErrE, Dec. 19, 1993, at B4 (available in WESTLAW, PAPERSCAN Data-
base). In his article, the author cites estimates by the Organization for Economic and
Co-operative Development that "less than a third of the income gains from the agree-
ment will go to the south, overwhelmingly to China and a few upper-income south-
east Asian countries ... [while] the European Community, the United States and
Japan will absorb the lion's share of the gains." Id.
110. Seng, supra note 108, at 2; see also GAT. Gatt Delegates Debate, supra note
107 (President Clinton and the International Labor Federations arguing for inclusion
of labor rights in the next round while the European Union is opposed to the idea
of including a GAT "social clause").
111. See Gatt Official Says Developing Countries Seeking Progress in Trade, Envi-
ronment, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Jan 26, 1994. Balkrishnan K Zutshi, GAT Coun-
cil chairman, states that: "To overlook [free trade, foreign aid and sharing technology
as necessary to sustain development) and instead focus the trade and environment
debate on polemics about greening the GATT would reduce the debate to an irrele-
vance for the great number of contracting parties. Worse than that, it would be
viewed as a serious protectionist threat to their trade interests." Id.
112. See GATT.. Delegates Debate, supra note 107 (GAIT members are in general
agreement that the next talks ought to include "environmental considerations").
113. See Court Ruling Fuels Discussion on NEPA Applicability to Trade Deal, INVL
TRADE DALY (BNA), July 23, 1993.
114. Trade Sanctions: Administration Unveils New Policy On Sanctions For En-
vironmental Harm, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Feb. 4, 1994. Timothy Wirth, the
Clinton administration's counselor on global affairs, expressed commitment to imple-
menting environmental reforms to the GAT while making a presentation to the Sen-
ate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Subcommittee on Foreign Commerce and
Tourism. See id. Stewart Hudson of the National Wildlife Federation added that an
environmentally sound GAIT "would ensure that U.S. manufacturers would have a
'level playing field' based on sustainable development in worldwide markets." Id.
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administration's position."5 Unlike GATT, NAFTA specifically lists inter-
national environmental agreements that supersede the GATT trade
rules."' Most likely, the United States will push for GATT adoption of
the environmental agreements already included in NAFrA' 7 This will
supposedly provide common environmental standards for all GATT mem-
bers, alleviate uncertainty, and encourage cooperation in seeking compli-
ance with these standards."8 Some expect international standards in-
cluded in NAFTA to encourage nations seeking to join this regional
agreement to step up their environmental laws to NAFrA levels as a
requisite to joining the agreement."9 But what are NAFrA's internation-
al standards and are they enforceable? Are they merely a watered down,
lowest common level of environmental protection? More importantly, do
they incorporate the requirement to prepare environmental impact as-
sessments prior to undertaking action?
IV. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
A. Codified, Non-binding International Agreements that Recommend
the Increased Utilization of Environmental Impact Assessments
In June 1992, on the twentieth anniversary of the Stockholm Declara-
tion of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,"n
115. See Hierarchy of Treaty Pre-emption Seen Affecting Future Trade Pacts, INT'L
TRADE DAILY (BNA), Jan. 13, 1994. Gary Hufbauer of the Institute of International
Economics believes that NAFrA establishes a precedent which will lead to future
trade agreements adopting more environmental measures into their framework. Id.
116. Id. Under NAFrA, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazard-
ous Waste and Their Disposal, and the Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna "trump" the GATr rules, allowing unilateral
"trade sanctions against violators." Id. For a detailed discussion of these agreements,
see infra notes 169-95 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
118. See generally NAFTA- Canada is Loser on Dispute Process Created Under
NAFTA, Home Study Says, INT'L TRADE DAILY, Aug. 9, 1994. (the Study "rejects sug-
gestions that the NAFTA will encourage a massive shift in investment toward partici-
pating countries where environment and labor standards are lowest").
119. See id.; NAFTA-Created Commission to Begin Environmental Effects Program
in 1995, INT'L TRADE DAILY, Dec. 1, 1994 (NAFrA standards are adaptable and must
be. upheld).
120. See generally Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Cotference on the
Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 (1972), reprinted in 11 LLM. 1416
(1972).
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"more than 170 countries met in Rio de Janeiro for the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development" (UNCED)."' The Con-
ference, symbolizing global recognition of the interconnected relationship
between development and the environment, "resulted in several docu-
ments including Agenda 21, a declaration concerning climate change,
biological diversity, and forest conservation. " "
Agenda 21 was comprised of two parts."n One part included a decla-
ration of commitment to achieving sustainable development by integrat-
ing environment and development decision-making as a top priority.'
The other part addressed how to achieve sustainable development by
creating and implementing new mechanisms for environmental compli-
ance and ensuring full participation by all countries in the law-making
process.'25 Countries generally agreed to the establishment of a United
Nations Commission for monitoring and reviewing purposes, but industri-
alized nations, including the United States, did not agree to demands for
a financing commitment of 0.7% of their GNP to assist developing
countries."
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, set forth twen-
ty-seven principles to guide environmental protection and economic de-
velopment worldwide.2 7 Included in this list of principles was the asser-
tion of an obligation to undertake environmental impact assessments."
According to the Council on Environmental Quality, the United States ne-
gotiators additionally emphasized, among other things, the principles of
public participation in decision-making and public access to informa-
tion."
The Rio Declaration, however, is a non-binding statement."3 Nothing
compels signatories of the Declaration to undertake environmental as-
sessments or include the public in decisions that affect the
121. Edith Brown Weiss, Introductory Note, United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development, 31 IL.M. 814 (1992).
122. Id. at 814-17.
123. See Agenda 21, supra note 14, pt. 1, at 12.
124. Id. This part also included a commitment to addressing worldwide and regional
problems of pollution, resource management, conservation of bio-diversity, and the
protection of global commons. Id. pt. 1, at 6-107.
125. See id. pt. 2, at 9.
126. See Weiss, supra note 121, at 815.
127. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development (June 14, 1992), Principle 13, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
151/5/Rev.1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 876-80 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declara-
tion].
128. Id. at 879 (Principle 17).
129. 23rd Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality 140 (1993).
130. See generally Rio Declaration, supra note 127.
1110
[Vol. 22: 1089, 19951 Stop Biting the Hand That Feeds Us
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
environment. 3' Notwithstanding the non-binding nature of the Declara-
tion, how can United States negotiators expect other countries to rec-
ognize the importance of public participation and access to information
in an international forum when they themselves are denying that infor-
mation to United States citizens at home?"n
The Convention on Biological Diversity"n "provides for national moni-
toring of biological diversity, the development of national strategies...
impact assessments of projects for adverse effects on biological diversity,
and national reports from parties on measures taken to implement the
convention and the effectiveness of these measures." " This Convention
also recognizes the importance of conducting environmental impact as-
sessments. Unfortunately, the United States did not sign it due to con-
cerns over points on "technology transfer and intellectual property rights
(Articles 16 and 22), biotechnology and biosafety (Article 19), and the
designation of the permanent financial mechanism (Articles 39 and
21)."13
The full name of the Statement of Principles on Forests, "A Non-legally
Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on
the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All
Types of Forests," underlines its weakness; it also is a non-binding state-
ment."3 Nevertheless, it is the first United Nations consensus on forest
conservation. 1
37
Even though none of the principles spelled out at UNCED are legally
binding on the parties present at the Conference, they represent a step in
the right direction, by codifying the importance of environmental as-
sessment in international documents."
131. Id.
132. See supra notes 21-38 and accompanying text.
133. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818
(1992).
134. Id. at 825.
135. Id. at 817; see also United States: Declaration Made At The United Nations
Environment Programme Conference For The Adoption Of The Agreed Text Of The
Convention On Biological Diversity (reproduced from the text of the Declaration at-
tached to the Nairobi Final Act provided by the United Nations Environment
Programme), 31 I.LM. 848 (1992).
136. Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consen-
sus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of
Forests, U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Annex 3, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1) (1993).
137. Id
138. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. Many countries ultimately accepted
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B. Enforceable International Agreements that Mandate Environmental
Impact Assessment for Particular Activities
One International Convention that deals specifically with preparation
of environmental impact assessments is the Convention on Environmen-
tal Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context," to which the
United States is a member.' ° The purpose of the Convention, as stated
in the Preamble, is to "minimize transboundary pollution through the
application of environmental impact assessments."'41
Article II of the Convention lists a number of general duties, including
the duty "to conduct an environmental impact assessment"a before ap-
proving a proposed activity"n listed in Appendix I.'" If an industrial
the principles proposed at the Rio Conference, but the United States remained op-
posed to the Biodiversity treaty. See Fact Sheet: US Environmental Accomplishments
in Support of UNCED, 3 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH. Supp. No. 4, 9, 11 (1992) (defend-
ing its opposition on the grounds that the treaty did not provide intellectual property
protection to those with the technological know-how to make bio-diversity a success).
But see Franklyn P. Salimbene, U.S. Business And Technology Transfer In The Post-
UNCED Environment, 17 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 31, 37 (1993) (arguing that despite
the concerns raised by the U.S. State Department, the Conference results should not
discourage U.S. businesses from participating in the "development and transfer of
technology").
139. The United Nations Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context, Feb. 25, 1991, U.N. Doc. EIECE/1250, reprinted in 30 I.LM.
800 (1991) [hereinafter U.N. Convention on Environment Impact Assessment].
140. Id. "As of June 11, 1991, the following had signed the Convention: Albania,
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Denmark,
European Economic Community, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain,
Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Unit-
ed Kingdom, United States." Id. at 800.
141. Id. at 802.
142. Id. "'Environmental impact assessment' means a national procedure for evaluat-
ing the likely impact of a proposed activity on the environment." Id.
143. Id. "'Proposed activity' means any activity or any major change to an activity
subject to a decision of a competent authority in accordance with an applicable na-
tional procedure." Id.
144. Id. The list of activities in the appendix include:
Crude oil refineries . . . installations for the gasification and liquefaction
of ... coal or bituminous shale . . . Thermal power stations and other com-
bustion installations ... nuclear power stations and other nuclear reac-
tors ... [ijnstallations solely designed for the production or enrichment of
nuclear fuels, for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuels or for the stor-
age, disposal and processing of radioactive waste ... installations for the
initial smelting of cast-iron and steel and for the production of non-ferrous
metals . . . [i]nstallations for the extraction . .. processing and
transformation of asbestos and products containing asbestos . .. for friction
material . . . [and for] [ilntegrated chemical installations.
Id. at 812-13.
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activity is listed in Appendix I, the Convention imposes on the signato-
ries the duty to prepare an environmental impact assessment in accor-
dance with Article 4 and Appendix II of the Convention.145 "A Party may
submit, by declaration, to compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ or to arbi-
tration pursuant to Appendix VII" to enforce the Convention's
provisions."4
The language of this Convention, reminiscent of the broad statutory
language used in NEPA, states that the parties are "aware of the interre-
lationship between economic activities and their environmental conse-
quences .... [and are] [dietermined to enhance international co-opera-
tion in assessing environmental impact[s].' 47
The Convention "commands" members to "ensure that, through their
national legal and administrative provisions and their national policies,
environmental impact assessment is carried out."" The entire docu-
ment reinforces the importance of considering environmental effects
early in the decision-making process "by applying environmental impact
assessment, at all appropriate administrative levels, as a necessary tool
to improve the quality of information presented to decision makers so
that environmentally sound decisions can be made paying careful atten-
tion to minimizing significant adverse impact.""9
145. Id. at 806 and Appendix II. Other relevant parts of the Convention include
Article 5 (Consultations on the Basis of the Environmental Impact Assessment Docu-
mentation), Article 6 (Final Decision), Article 7 (Post-Project Analysis), Article 8 (Bi-
lateral and Multilateral Co-Operation), and Article 15 (Settlement Of Disputes). Id. at
806-07, 810.
Arguably, if any of these activities are undertaken, whether it be under NAFrA
or otherwise, United States would be obligated to prepare an EIS. The problem here
is that the law of treaties only allows nations to bring a claim in front of the ICJ,
not individuals. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 (1991). Therefore, al-
though the U.S. has an existing obligation to prepare EISs for certain activities, only
other nations can sue for noncompliance, something highly unlikely given the U.S.'s
political might and other countries' fear of economic retaliation.
146. U.N. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment, supra note 139, at 806-
07, 810.
147. Id. at 802. The Convention also incorporates relevant provisions of "the Charter
of the United Nations, the Declaration of the Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
(CSCE) and the Concluding Documents of the Madrid and Vienna Meetings of Repre-




Under the Convention, the type of environmental impact that will trig-
ger the duty to prepare an environmental impact statement is exten-
sive." "Impact" is broadly defined as "any effect caused by a proposed
activity on the environment."''
Additionally, the Convention mandates that each party "shall take the
necessary legal, administrative or other measures to implement the provi-
sions of this Convention, including.., the establishment of an environ-
mental impact assessment procedure that permits public participation
and preparation of the environmental impact assessment documenta-
tion." "
The principle underlying these environmental conventions and declara-
tions is the assessment of environmental impact before an activity is
approved. Unfortunately, United States negotiators did not include any of
the above-mentioned conventions in NAFTA, and opted instead for envi-
ronmental agreements that concentrate on control and reduction of al-
ready existing activities that they deem harmful to the environment."
C. Environmental Agreements Included in the North American Free
Trade Agreement
Commentators heralded NAFTA as the "greenest" trade agreement
yet."n The United States, Canada, and Mexico agreed on some environ-
mental provisions that contain specific language of commitment to the
promotion of "sustainable development."' NAFrA states that the par-
ties are not to lower their health, safety, and environmental standards for
purposes of attracting foreign investment."
NAFrA also contains provisions whereby members resolve conflict
through the North American Commission on the Environment
(NACE). 57 The commission will be made up of environmental ministers
150. See 30 I.LM. 800, 803 (1991) (section (vii) defines "impact" and section (viii)
defines "transboundary impact").
151. Id. "Transboundary impact' means any impact, not exclusively of a global na-
ture, within an area under the jurisdiction of a Party caused by a proposed activity
the physical origin of which is situated wholly or in part within the area under the
jurisdiction of another Party." Id.
152. Id. at 803 (emphasis added).
153. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
154. 23rd Annual Report, supra note 1, at 52; Will Dunham, Wildlife Group Backs
Free Trade, Hous. CHRON., Sept 17, 1992, at 2.
155. 23rd Annual Report, supra note 1, at 52.
156. Id.
157. Id. For the final draft of the NAFrA Environmental Cooperation Agreement,
see North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32
LL.M. 1480 (1993) (containing language limiting the Commission's role to that of con-
sidering and recommending courses of action) [hereinafter NAFTA Environmental
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of all three countries, and its functions will include providing a forum for
resolution of disputes as well as studying issues of mutual concern like
the effects of trade on the environment."
NAFTA incorporates several international environmental agreements
into its framework, stating that in the event of conflict between NAFTA
and GATT rules, the environmental agreements shall prevail."s For ex-
ample, if any inconsistency arises between NAFTA and the trade obli-
gations set out in either the Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the Montreal Protocol on Sub-
stances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the Basel Convention on the Con-
trol of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Dis-
posal, or agreements set out in Annex 104.1 of NAFTA, "such obligations
shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency." "e In this regard,
NAFTA sets a precedent for trade agreements between industrialized and
developing nations whereby the parties to a trade agreement agree to
incorporate common environmental goals as well as schemes to pay for
environmental clean-ups. 6'
The first of such agreements is the Protocol on Substances that De-
plete the Ozone Layer, commonly known as the Protocol on
Chlorofluorocarbons, which was signed in Montreal on September 16,
1987." The Protocol specifies the signatories' obligations to "limit and
reduce" the use of CFCs and other ozone-depleting chemicals."
Cooperation].
158. Id.
159. Hierarchy of Treaty Pre-emption Seen Affecting The Future Trade Pacts, INT'L
TRADE DAILY (BNA), Jan. 13, 1994, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAITD File.
Economist Gary Hufbauer, senior fellow for the Institute of International Economics
feels that GATT is preempted by the environmental agreements in NAFrA, resulting
in the parties' ability to use trade sanctions against the violators of these agreements
despite the GATT NTB rules. Id.
160. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). The
environmental agreements listed in Annex 104.1 are The Agreement Between the Gov-
eminent of Canada and the Government of the United States of America Concerning
the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste and the Agreement Between the
United States of America and the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Pro-
tection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area. Id. at 298.
161. See NAFrA Environmental Cooperation, supra note 157.
162. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 10, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in 26 IL.M. 1550
(1987), amended and adjusted, S. Treaty Doc. No. 4, 102d Cong. 1st Sess. (1991),
reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 537 (1991) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
163. Id.
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The Protocol also calls for a systematic phase-out of consumption and
production of CFCs including deadlines for compliance with these phase-
out plans.' In addition, it bans trading and importation of controlled
substances with non-parties and discourages exports except to develop-
ing countries that may delay compliance."a In contrast, members are
encouraged to exchange information on technology to help achieve its
goals.'" The obvious objective behind these provisions is to encourage
non-members to sign the Protocol. As for enforcement, the Protocol
adopted assessment and review measures to be conducted by expert
panels every four years, commencing in 1990.7
In 1991, the parties agreed to adjust the target levels of consumption
and production, and include halons as a controlled substance." Neither
the Protocol nor its amendment expressly call for parties' preparation of
environmental impact assessments.
Another environmental agreement incorporated into NAFTA is the 1989
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Haz-
ardous Waste and Their Disposal." In August 1992, the Senate agreed
to ratify this Convention. 7 ' The Convention "was designed to stop ex-
ports of hazardous wastes to countries that are either unaware they are
receiving such shipments or do not have appropriate facilities to treat or
dispose of the wastes."'7' In the preamble, the parties stated their
awareness of the risks caused by the transboundary movement of haz-
ardous wastes and acknowledged the potential threat to health and the
environment." In light of this threat, the Convention calls on the par-
ties to reduce the generation of such wastes and, alternatively, to take
the necessary steps to ensure that disposal is "consistent with the protec-
164. The phase out on consumption levels seeks to initially reduce consumption to
1986 levels, then to 80%, then to 50% of those 1986 levels. Id. art. 2.
165. Id. art. 5.
166. Id. arts. 9 & 10.
167. Id. art. 6. These enforcement measures were scheduled to be conducted by ex-
pert panels beginning in 1990. Id.
168. The adjustments require "1995 levels not to exceed 50%, with 10% exception to
satisfy basic domestic needs; 1997 levels not to exceed 15%, with 10% exception; 2000
levels not to exceed 0^, with 15% exception ... [slame targets as above [for
halons], except there is no interim goal between 1995 and 2000." Montreal Protocol,
supra note 162, at 537-40.
169. See United Nations Environment Programme Conference on Plenipotentiaries on
the Global Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes: Final Act And Text Of Basel Convention, U.N. Doc. IG.80/L12 (1989), reprint-
ed in 28 LLM. 649 (1989).
170. INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) July 29, 1993, available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
BNATID File [hereinafter Basel Convention].
171. Hazardous Waste: Export Ban Included In Options For Administration Basel
Convention Bill, 24 ENvrL REP. (BNA) 563 (July 30, 1993).
172. Basel Convention, supra note 170, at 657.
1116
[Vol. 22: 1089, 1995] Stop Biting the Hand That Feeds Us
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
tion of human health and the environment whatever the place of their
disposal."' 3
The parties to the Convention agreed to use the international law of
treaties in case of a material breach of any provisions."' The Conven-
tion also promotes technology transfer to help developing countries man-
age hazardous wastes. 5
A member party exporting hazardous wastes to other countries is re-
quired to provide information about the effects of the proposed
transboundary movement on health and the environment. Also, parties
are to "[co-operate with other parties and interested organizations by
disseminating information on the transboundary movement of hazardous
wastes."7 ' However, the requirements set forth by the Basel Convention
also fall short of calling for an environmental impact statement. Even if it
called for one, the aggrieved party within the recognized system of inter-
national law has to be another nation, leaving no possible avenue of
relief for aggrieved private parties.
The third environmental agreement included in NAFTA is the Conven-
tion on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and
Fauna (CITES).'-
While the inclusion of these environmental agreements in NAFTA is
commendable as a first in international trade negotiations, they are, nev-
ertheless, less stringent than currently existing United States laws. None
require the preparation of an EIS before conducting trade activity that
may harm the environment. One could argue that incorporating NEPA's
EIS requirement into NAFTA is unworkable because the United States
"cannot be telling our neighbors to the north and to the south what they
can and cannot do.""8
Indeed, the principle of sovereignty would preclude the United States
from regulating the actions of another nation, or its citizens, while acting
outside the United States. However, this principle does not preclude the
application of United States environmental requirements for actions by
173. Id.
174. Id. at 658. Again, the law of treaties does not recognize individuals as a legal
personality. See supra note 145 and accompanying text
175. Basel Convention, supra note 170, at 659.
176. Id. at 663.
177. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (CITES), Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 50 C.F.R. § 23 (1994).
178. 139 CONG. REC. § 16005 (statement by Sen. Hatch); see also note 69 and ac-
companying text
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its own agencies and citizens, particularly where the result of such ac-
tions could have significant impact within the United States. Despite this,
United States trade negotiators opposed the preparation of an EIS for
NAFTA. The OTR's position that NEPA's EIS requirement does not apply
to their legislative proposal for NAFTA is irreconcilable with their postur-
ing and open promotion of the use of environmental assessments at the
UNCED.
D. The European Community Model
In 1992 the EC effectively became a "Union.""m The Maastricht sum-
mit "mark[ed] a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer un-
ion among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely
as possible to the citizen."'" It will also facilitate the future fulfillment
of the ultimate goals of the Union, including promotion of "balanced and
sustainable" economic and social development, the reduction of internal
frontiers, the establishment of a single currency system, the "implementa-
tion of a common foreign and security policy" and finally, the protection
of individual rights. 8'
Article 168(A)(1) of the Single European Act'" provides that "certain
classes of action or proceeding[s] brought by natural or legal persons"
may be reviewed by the Court of Justice."n The European Council is in
charge of adopting "harmonization measures" with regard to the envi-
ronment. If a member state applies independent national environmental
provisions, the Commission decides whether such national provisions are
"a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade
between Member States.""4 The Commission, as well as any member
state "may bring the matter directly before the Court of Justice if it con-
siders that another Member State is making improper use of [its] pow-
ers ..... 18
Title VII of the EEC Treaty sets forth general objectives of the preser-
vation, protection, and prudent utilization of natural resources." To
179. See Treaty On European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.LM. 247 (1992).
180. Id. at 253.
181. Id.
182. Feb. 17-28, 1986, 25 LLM. 503, 506 (1986) (listing the 1986 Single European
Act along with modifications on environmental protection). The Act "is an expression
of the political resolve ... to transform the whole complex of relations between
their States into a European Union, in line with the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration of
June 19, 1983." Id. at 503.
183. Id. at 508.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 512. Articles 169 and 170 authorize this approach. Id.
186. Id. at 515.
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achieve these goals, environmental action by the Community "shall be
based on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that envi-
ronmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source, and that
the polluter should pay.""7 Any action by the Community regarding the
environment calls for the consideration of scientific and technical data,
existing regional environmental conditions, risk-benefit analysis of pro-
posed actions versus alternatives, and the economic and social develop-
mental needs of the Community as a whole." While members are, of
course, still encouraged to implement local environmental measures, the
Community as a whole addresses broader actions requiring co-opera-
tion."
When action is required by the Community, Article 130(S), provides
that "[tlhe Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Comnis-
sion and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and
Social Committee, shall decide what action is to be taken by the Commu-
nity."" An important provision allows member states to maintain or in-
troduce more stringent environmental measures than those adopted in
common, as long as they are compatible with the Maastricht summit.'9'
Upon comparison of the above provisions with the non-binding lan-
guage surrounding the environmental provisions for NAFTA, one can
easily see that NAFTA calls for "unilateral" rather than "unified" action
by the member states, and only with respect to their own territory.'"
Furthermore, the parties are only obligated to "consider" recommenda-
tions developed by the Council."n The Council's role is limited to en-
couraging "effective enforcement by each Party of its environmental laws




190. Id. at 515-16.
191. Id at 516.
192. Canada-Mexico-United States: North American Agreement on Environmental Co-
operation, Sept. 8-14, 1993 32 I.LM. 1480 (1993). NAFrA states that "[elach Party
shall, with respect to its territory- (a) periodically prepare and make publicly avail-
able reports on the state of the environment; (b) promote education in environmental
matters, including environmental law; (c) further scientific research and technology
development in respect of environmental matters; (d) assess, as appropriate, environ-
mental impacts; and (e) promote the use of economic instruments for the efficient
achievement of environmental goals." Id. at 1483.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1486. The Council is also supposed to "promote" and "develop" recom-
mendations regarding environmental impact statements and public access to informa-
1119
Another obvious problem in NAFTA is that the multinational panel set
up to review compliance of environmental assessments focuses on reme-
dial, not preventive measures. In reviewing the parties' compliance, it
examines past actions of the parties such as a "persistent pattern of
failure to effectively enforce its environmental law... [and] the reasons,
if any, provided by the Party for not fully implementing an action
plan.
19 5
In terms of the application of a cohesive international environmental
agenda, the European model is a great example of a regional agreement
that provides a uniform approach to environmental assessment, regula-
tion, and most importantly, binding enforcement provisions that ensure
compliance. The model has effectively constitutionalized the right to
environmental protection, something the United States is unwilling to do
with NEPA. Additionally, the EC model is simply more effective than
NAFTA because: (a) it embraces joint, not unilateral action; (b) it uses a
uniform body to settle disputes that has the power to issue binding deci-
sions, and not mere recommendations; and (c) because the successful
set-up of an authoritative enforcement body allows the EC to settle dis-
putes without resorting to unilateral trade sanctions that, if utilized, can
only serve to create animosity between parties.
V. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969
In enacting NEPA, Congress declared a broad national environmental
policy
[T]o encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environ-
ment; to... eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate
the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological sys-
tems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on
Environmental Quality.'"
In enacting NEPA, Congress recognized that the past history of dealing
with environmental problems was quite inadequate. 7
A. Title I: Purpose, Scope, and Requirements
The first major part of the Act is Congress' statement of the Act's poli-
cy and declaration of its goals, both stated using broad language. In Sec-
tion concerning the environment. Id.
195. Id. at 1492.
196. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 et seq. (1993) (congressional declaration of purpose).
197. 115 CONG. REC. 40,415 (1969). As pointed out in the congressional record,
NEPA's new approaches were to deal with these problems on a "preventive and an-
ticipatory basis" rather than focus on "efforts to deal with 'crises' and to 'reclaim'
our resources" once environmental abuse has already taken place. Id.
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tion 101, Congress "recogniz[ed] the profound impact of man's activity
on... the natural environment."' Congress specifically acknowledged
"population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial expansion, re-
source exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances" as
activities that impact our environment." Trade agreements often in-
clude many, if not all of the activities Congress recognized as affecting
the environment. NEPA mandates consideration of such trade activities,
like chemical pollution and world resource exploitation.'
Congress further declared that "it is the continuing policy of the Feder-
al Government... to use all practicable means and measures.., to
create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in
productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other require-
ments of present and future generations of Americans.""' Congress' in-
tent was that responsible decision-making would lead to "attain[ing] the
widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation
[or] risk to health or safety."'
Section 4332 of the Act provides the main "action-forcing" procedural
mechanism to ensure compliance with NEPA's general goals.' Specifi-
cally, section 4332(2)(C) requires that all federal agencies "include in
every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on... the
environmental impact of the proposed action." ' Such statement is
commonly referred to as an environmental impact statement or EIS.
The purpose of this "action forcing" procedure is "to insure that the
policies and goals defined in [NEPA] are infused into the ongoing pro-
grams and actions of the Federal Government."' The U.S. could apply
NEPA's procedural EIS requirement to trade agreements and thereby
foster Congress' goal of productive harmony between man and nature
without being inconsistent with other national policy concerns.
198. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1977).
199. Id.
200. Swain v. Brinegar, 517 F.2d 766, 775 (1975).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1988); see supra note 197. These "practicable" means to
improve Federal plans and programs ought to be "consistent with other essential
considerations of national policy." 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1988).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3) (1988) (emphasis added).
203. See ANDERSON & DANIELS, supra note 16, at 2-3.
204. 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C) (1988).
205. 115 CONG. REC. 40415, 40416 (1969).
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Congress directed federal agencies to administer U.S. policy in accor-
dance with section 102(2)(c) and the other provisions in the chapter, "to
the fullest extent possible." An EIS "informs the public of environmental
consequences of and alternatives to proposed actions and enables evalua-
tion, comment and intervention."' "It ensures that environmental con-
siderations are placed before the ultimate decision-maker-the pub-
lic-before federal agencies undertake environmentally damaging ac-
tions." 7 Agencies proposing legislation and "any other major Federal
action" must make available to the public a detailed statement on:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should the pro-
posal be implemented,
(iii) to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between short-term uses of man's environment and the main-
tenance and enhancement of long term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.'
In this respect, NEPA is a full disclosure law seeking to make federal
agencies act more responsibly toward the environment.'
In section 102(f), Congress specifically recognized the global character
of environmental challenges by stating:
[AJIR agencies of the Federal Government shall... recognize the worldwide and
long-range character of environmental problems and, where consistent with the
foreign policy of the United States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolu-
tions, and programs designed to maximize international cooperation in anticipat-
ing and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's world environment.210
1. Legislative History
NEPA's legislative history reflects congressional intent that federal
agencies "participate in the development of a positive, forward-looking
program of international cooperation in dealing with environmental prob-
lems."211 Congress clearly intended this provision in NEPA to encourage
application of the EIS process to foreign policy actions, like international
206. L LYNN HOGUE, PUBLIc HEALTH AND THE LAW 370 (1980).
207. Id.
208. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1977). The requirements governing disclosure of agencies'
comments on the necessity of NEPA's EIS requirement and its contents are under the
provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. See 115 CONG. REC. 40,420 (1969).
209. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps. of Eng'rs of United States Army,
325 F. Supp. 749, 759 (1971) (finding that Congress intended the Act to make
decisionmaking more responsive and more responsible to the environment).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 4932 (F) (1977).
211. 115 CONG. REC. 404015, 40416-17 (1969).
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trade agreements, at least to the extent that NEPA doesn't conflict with
foreign policy objectives.
Congress additionally clarified its intent that federal agencies apply
NEPA to "the fullest extent possible" by stating that such language is "in-
tended to assure that all agencies of the Federal Government shall com-
ply with the directives.., and that no agency shall seek to construe its
existing statutory authorizations in a manner to avoid compliance.""'
NEPA's EIS requirement is Congress' own initiative to prevent the
future decline of mankind's environment. As such, the preparation of an
EIS in conjunction with international trade agreements would ensure the
proper evaluation of the impact on the environment and the potential
alternatives for the provisions contained therein. Furthermore, the United
States could utilize the report's conclusions to gain important trade con-
cessions on environmental enforcement changes that enhance our mutual
environment. This is particularly important with respect to Mexico and
Canada, with whom we share immediate geographic borders, and with
whom we have had environmental enforcement problems in the past.
2. Executive Order 12,114'
Issued in 1979, this Order furthers NEPA's purpose by requiring an EIS
for major federal actions "with respect to the environment outside the
United States, its territories and possessions."2"4 The Executive Order
requires an EIS for major federal actions significantly affecting global
commons such as the oceans or Antarctica; actions significantly affecting
the environment of a third party nation not participating in the action
with the U.S.; actions significantly affecting a foreign nation that provide
that nation products, or projects that produce principal products, emis-
sions, or effluents that are "prohibited or strictly regulated by Federal
law in the United States" in order to protect the public from toxicity or
radioactive substances.21
Many of the activities to be conducted under the provisions of NAFTA
fall under the above-stated categories of federal actions requiring an EIS.
But the Order has numerous exemptions from the EIS requirement, in-
cluding "actions taken by the President" and actions that pose "difficul-
ties of obtaining information and agency ability to analyze meaningfully
212. Id.
213. Exec. Order No. 12,114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (1979).
214. Id. § 1-1. (emphasis added).
215. Id. § 2, 3(a)-(d).
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environmental effects of a proposed action."218 This latter exemption
provides an out for any agency that decides they do not want to prepare
an EIS by simply claiming an EIS would be too difficult to prepare."1 7
The Executive Order further allows for categorical exclusions from the
EIS requirement in the case of emergency or exceptional foreign policy
or national security situations."8
Finally, the Order specifically points out that it exists "solely for the
purposes of establishing internal procedures for Federal agencies to
consider the significant effects of their actions on the environment out-
side the United States, its territories and possessions, and nothing in
[the] Order shall be construed to create a cause of action.""' Therefore,
this language clearly precludes private parties from seeking relief when
agencies fail to comply with the Order.
B. Title II: The Council On Environmental Quality
Title II of the Act creates the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
and defines its primary responsibilities.o The Council's responsibilities
include assisting and advising the President on environmental issues,
reviewing and appraising federal programs and activities that affect the
environment, and providing recommendations to the President."' In
1978, the CEQ issued binding regulations on EIS preparation to all feder-
al agencies. 2 The courts give these regulations substantial defer-
ence.' Their declared purpose was "to tell federal agencies what they
must do to comply with the procedures and achieve the goals of the
Act." 4
In contrast to the Supreme Court decisions holding that NEPA does
not create substantive rights, CEQ's regulations plainly state: "The presi-
dent, the federal agencies, and the courts share responsibility for enforc-
ing the Act so as to achieve the substantive requirements of section
216. Id. § 2 - 5(a)(ii), 5(b)(iii)(5).
217. This is exactly what the USTR did in response to Public Citizen's request for
an EIS on NAFrA.
218. Exec. Order No. 12,114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957, § 2-5(c) (1979).
219. Id. at 1960-62, § 3-1.
220. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-4347 (1988).
221. Council on Environmental Quality, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508; supra note 197, at
40, 421.
222. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3 (making parts 1500-1508 binding on all federal agencies).
223. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979) (finding that the CEQ's inter-
pretation of NEPAs is given deference); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,
490 U.S. 332, 355 (1989) (indicating that requiring agencies to take a "hard look" at
the effect of their actions and providing groups of individuals access to important
information are the two main functions of the EIS requirement).
224. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (1994).
1124
[Vol. 22: 1089, 1995] Stop Biting the Hand That Feeds Us
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
101. "' Ironically, the Supreme Court has interpreted NEPA's mandate
as essentially procedural even though it also held that "CEQ regulations
are entitled to substantial deference. " " According to the CEQ, the EIS
procedural requirement is a means.of ensuring that quality environmental
information is available to the public before federal agencies implement
actions.'
Most importantly, the CEQ guidelines not only reinforce that NEPA
requires an EIS to be included "in every recommendation or report...
[o]n proposals... [f]or legislation and... [o]ther major Federal ac-
tions," but also defines potentially problematic terminology such as "Fed-
eral agency," "proposals," and "legislation." '
The CEQ defines "Federal agency" as all agencies of the federal gov-
ernment except "the Congress, the Judiciary, or the President, including
the performance of staff functions for the President in his Executive
Office."' But, according to the CEQ's own definitions, it considers trea-
ties and international conventions or agreements a category of federal
agency action capable of triggering NEPA's EIS requirement.'a The
CEQ further defines a "proposal" as existing when a federal agency (as
defined above) has a goal, is actively contemplating alternative means to
achieving that goal, and the effects of such alternatives can be "meaning-
fully evaluated. " " The CEQ defines legislation as:
[A] bill or legislative proposal to Congress developed by or with significant coop-
eration and support of a Federal agency.... [TJhe test for significant cooperation
is whether the proposal is in fact predominantly that of the agency rather than
another source. Drafting does not by itself constitute significant cooperation. Pro-
posals for legislation include requests for ratification of treaties. Only the agency
which has primary responsibility for the subject matter involved will prepare a
legislative environmental impact statement.'
CEQ's definition of federal action, expressly states that it includes
trade agreements such as NAFTA. Furthermore, NAFrA was unquestion-
ably "developed by or with significant cooperation and support of"
OTR.' OTR did not merely draft the proposals for NAFTA; it negotiat-
225. Id. (emphasis added).
226. Andrus, 442 U.S. at 358.
227. See CEQ Report, supra note 22, at 140.
228. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.3 (1994).
229. Id. § 1508.12.
230. Id. § 1508.18.
231. Id. § 1508.23.
232. Id. § 1508.17 (emphasis added).
233. Nafta Impact Statement Ruling Seen Giving U.S. Increased Clout In Side
1125
ed the entire agreement. As the primary federal agency involved in nego-
tiating the agreement, OTR should have provided a legislative EIS.
In the past, the CEQ also expressed its view that NEPA applies
extraterritorially, not only with respect to actions affecting our global
commons, but when the federal government's action only effects a for-
eign country.2m It is unfortunate that CEQ never included this view in
the final draft of its guidelines and regulations, since the courts eventual-
ly held such regulations as binding on all federal agencies.2
Under the Reagan and Bush administrations, the CEQ's budget was
significantly reduced while its access, influence, and authority de-
clined.' In particular, the Reagan administration, in its last days, reject-
ed CEQ's proposed recommendations calling for a requirement that fed-
eral agencies consider the impact of their actions on the global environ-
ment. Such recommendations were never incorporated during the Bush
administration. 7 The CEQ remained conspicuously quiet throughout
the NAF'rA-EIS controversy.' This is possibly due to political pressure,
especially in light of the current administration's plan to scrap the CEQ
and pass its responsibilities and functions on to the EPA.'_
Notwithstanding the current controversy, the CEQ has still played an
instrumental role in interpreting and passing regulation that effectively
Agreement Talks, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), July 2, 1993. Nicholas Yost of the Wash-
ington law firm of Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin, former general counsel for the CEQ
under the Carter administration, stated that the District Court's decision that NEPA
applies to proposals for ratification of trade agreements "was a sound one." Id. Yost
further stated that prior administrations, including the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Rea-
gan administrations, presented an EIS for about a dozen treaty-related legislative
packages. Id.
234. See Council on Environmental Quality, Memorandum on the Application of the
EIS Requirement to Environmental Impacts Abroad of Major Federal Actions, 42 Fed.
Reg. 61,068-69 (1977); see also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 647
F.2d 1345, 1386 n.156 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Robinson J., concurring).
235. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(1970); see also Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1979).
236. See 137 CONG. REC. S7631 (1991); 135 CONG. REC. H6837 (1991) (criticizing the
Reagan-Bush administrations for ignoring the CEQ).
237. 135 CONG. REC. S5991 (1991). The recommendations were ignored even after
numerous members of Congress, including present Vice-President Al Gore, asked Bush
to direct the CEQ to issue guidelines that will ensure federal agency consideration of
the effect of their actions on global warming. Id. (letter from members of Congress
to the President).
238. CEQ: White House "Stonewalling" Hill on EIS Oversight, GREENWIRE, July 30,
1993.
239. See Baucus Offers Recommendations On NAFTA Environmental Commission,
INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Mar. 9, 1993. William Reilly, administrator of the EPA dur-
ing the Bush presidency feels that the EPA already has enough conflicts to try to
"watchdog" federal agency compliance of NEPA. Reilly Weighs In On Broumer,
Enviros, CEQ, GREENWIRE, Nov. 23, 1993 (interview).
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codified existing NEPA case law.u But while the CEQ played a sub-
stantial role by establishing guidelines for NEPA compliance, the courts
clearly assumed the principal role as enforcers and interpreters of
NEPA.
C. The Courts
Agency compliance with NEPA's procedural EIS requirement is not
discretionary and must be complied with in the absence of a "clear and
unavoidable conflict in statutory authority. "u2 The problem is that the
courts, the legislature, federal agencies, and environmental groups often
differ in opinion as to what constitutes clear and unavoidable conflict
with the statutory language.
In several opinions,' the United States Supreme Court interpreted
Title I of the Act as not creating any new substantive rights, holding
instead that only the procedural provisions stemming from the Act's EIS
requirement were judicially enforceable.' Several members of Con-
gress repeatedly criticized this view.u5 Nevertheless, the result of these
opinions has made NEPA's procedural requirements, mainly the EIS pro-
vision, the main focus of litigation. Accordingly, the courts have carved
out their own set of judicial review requirements for NEPA actions,
which must be met before a NEPA claim can be litigated.
240. See supra notes 220-35 and accompanying text.
241. See ENVTL L. INST. FED. ENVTL. L 242 (Erica L Dolgin & Thomas G.P., Gilbert
eds. 1972).
242. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, 788 (1975) (holding
NEPA inapplicable where it conflicts with statutory requirements of the Interstate
Land Sales Full Disclosure Act); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449
F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that United States Atomic Energy Commis-
sion's procedural rules did not comply with NEPA requirements).
243. "NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its man-
date to the agencies is essentially procedural." Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (citing Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422
U.S. 289, 319 (1975)).
244. See J. GORDON ARBUCKLE ET AL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 372; see also
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 405-406 (1976) (emphasizing that the only proce-
dural requirements imposed by NEPA are those stated in the plain language of the
Act). But see Nicholas Yost, NEPA's Promise-Partially FuifiUed, 20 ENVTL L 533
(1990) (where the author attacks the Supreme Court for failing to recognize the legis-
lative intent that. the Court engage in substantive review of agencies' NEPA viola-
tions).
245. See infra note 299.
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1. Judicial Review
CEQ's advice to the courts with respect to judicial review is that
courts refrain from judicial review of agency compliance until an agency
"has filed the final environmental impact statement, or has made a final
finding of no significant impact (when such a finding will result in action
affecting the environment), or takes action that will result in irreparable
injury."  Judicial review of a federal agency's decision can vary be-
cause there is a split in the courts as to whether the courts should re-
view agency action under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard or the
"reasonableness" standard.247 The more widely accepted approach is the
arbitrary and capricious standard.' Under this standard, review of
agency decision not to prepare an EIS requires that the plaintiff prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's decision is arbitrary
and capricious."
Application of the arbitrary and capricious standard results in substan-
tial deference to agency decisions since the standard requires only that
agencies "adequately" consider the environmental impact of its action.'s
246. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3 (1994); 43 Fed. Reg. 55,990 (Nov. 28, 1978).
247. For a general discussion of these two standards under NEPA, see Comment,
Shall We Be Arbitrary Or Reasonable: Standards of Reniew For Agency Threshold
Determination Under NEPA, 19 AKRON L. REV. 685 (1986). For examples of decisions
applying the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, see Citizens For A Better Henderson
v. Hodel, 768 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1985) (denying injunctive relief on construction of
electric plant based on insufficiency of EIS); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289
(8th Cir. 1976) (denying plaintiffs request for an injunction on dam construction pro-
ject based on the inadequacy of the EIS prepared). For a decision applying the "rea-
sonableness" standard, see Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1985) (denying
injunction on construction of harbor).
248. See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989) (requiring
courts using the "reasonableness" standard to reexamine their method of review). For
an example of a decision in which the court abandoned the "reasonableness" stan-
dard in favor of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard and ultimately held that the
agency decision not to prepare an EIS was not "arbitrary and capricious," see Sabine
River Authority v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 951 F.2d 669 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 75 (1992); see also Greenpeace Action v. Barbara Franklin and Nat'l Marine Fish-
eries Serv., No. 91-36062 (9th Cir. 1992) (switching to the "arbitrary and capri-
cious"/"hard look" standard in light of the Marsh decision).
249. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980).
250. Accordingly, as long as an agency complies with the "statutory minima," its
decision of whether to prepare an EIS effectively escapes judicial review. Vermont
Yankee, 435 U.S. at 548. But see National Latino Media Coalition v. FCC, 816 F.2d
785, 789 (1987) (stating that existing case law suggests that principles of fairness
should dictate notice-and-comment procedures for any interpretative rule that substan-
tially impacts people's legal rights) (citing Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507
F.2d 1107, 1112-13 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626, 640-41
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (same).
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[Oince an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's procedural re-
quirements, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered
the environmental consequences; it cannot 'interject itself within the area of dis-
cretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken.'"
In reviewing agency action, courts have held that NEPA's goal is to
"insure a fully informed and well considered decision, not necessarily a
decision the judges... would have reached had they been members of
the decisionmaking unit of the agency." ' But in Baltimore Gas & Elec-
tric Co. v. National Resource Defense Council, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that, in addition to the duty to consider the environmental im-
pact of its action, the agencies must also fulfill NEPA's other goal, that
of "ensur[ing] that the agency will inform the public that it has indeed
considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process." '
Yet, almost in the same breath, the Court retreated by cautioning that
Congress did not, however, intend "to elevate environmental concerns
over other appropriate considerations. " ' 4
In sum, the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of judicial review is
one of great deference toward agency determination as to whether or not
it must prepare an EIS.' Some court decisions have held that even ac-
tions that present a risk, or certainty, of environmental damage are not
precluded by NEPA if the agency decision is not arbitrary and capri-
cious.' How can a court conclude that an action is not arbitrary and
251. Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 227 (quoting Kieppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390,
410 n.21 (1976)).
252. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558. If the agency has taken a "hard look" at
whether its actions require an EIS and decides not to prepare one, even erroneously,
the courts may not subsequently substitute their judgment for that of the agency.
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976); see also Foundation on Econom-
ic Trends v. Thomas, 637 F. Supp. 25, 29 (D.C. 1986) (holding that NEPA's EIS re-
quirements do not apply to EPA decision to authorize testing of certain bacteria
strains since the decision was made in compliance with EPA's regulatory framework
that, akin to NEPA's mandates, already requires thorough consideration of environ-
mental impacts).
253. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. National Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87,
97-101 (1983) (discussing the twin aims of NEPA).
254. Id. at 97 (emphasizing that NEPA doesn't elevate environmental concerns over
other concerns, but rather, requires that agencies take a "hard look" at potential
environmental impacts before acting). Id.
255. See Greenpeace USA v. Steve, 748 F. Supp. 765 (D. Haw. 1990) (agency's deci-
sion not to supplement an EIS will not be set aside unless it is arbitrary & capri-
cious).
256. See North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 345 (D.D.C. 1979) (dis-
cussing EIS requirement under the APA in light of development plans for the outer
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capricious when it is certain that it will result in environmental damage?
Under a purely economic analysis, many agency decisions would escape
the arbitrary and capricious label so long as there is some sort of eco-
nomic payoff as, for example, the discovery of additional oil reserves in
Alaska's pristine coastal plains. Accordingly, agencies can easily over-
come the arbitrary and capricious standard by presenting a persuasive
risk-benefit argument despite the negative implications on the environ-
ment. 7
In Sierra Club v. United States Department of Transportation, the
court identified four elements that must be present before a court under-
takes judicial review of an agency decision not to prepare an EIS.'
First, the agency must have accurately identified the relevant environmental con-
cern. Second, once the agency has identified the problem, it must have taken a
"hard look" at the problem in preparing the EA [environmental assessment]. Third,
if a finding of no significant impact is made, the agency must be able to make a
convincing case for its finding. Last, if the agency does find an impact of true
significance, preparation of an EIS can be avoided only if the agency finds that
changes or safeguards in the project sufficiently reduce the impact to a mini-
mum.=
The determination of whether or not there exists a "significant impact"
on the environment has been a prime focus of litigation, with the word
"significant" becoming "a chameleon-like word that takes its functional
meaning from its context. "2" Furthermore, even when an agency action
is determined to have "significant impact," NEPA may still not apply
because the action is exempt"' or because there is another statute that
controls.262
continental shelf); Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 472 (turning down petition to en-
join Alaska lease sale), vacated in part as moot, 439 U.S. 922 (1978).
257. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 32 (1992).
258. Id. at 127; Sierra Club v. United States Dep't of Transp., 753 F.2d 120, 127
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
259. Sierra Club, 753 F.2d at 127; see also Center For Marine Conservation v.
Brown, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3801, 8 (Civil Action No. 92-2471(JHG)).
260. Louisiana Wildlife Fed'n v. York, 761 F.2d 1044, 1052-53 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding
that forest clearing plan warranted preparation of an EIS) (quoting Environmental
Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 991 (5th Cir. 1981)); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471
F.2d 823, 830-33 (2d Cir. 1972) (factoring in the qualitative and quantitative effects in
determining whether there exists a risk of significant impact on the environment).
261. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
262. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 558, 558 (1978);
see also Merrell v. Thomas, 608 F. Supp. 644, 647 (D. Or. 1985) (holding NEPA inap-
plicable where FIFRA's procedural requirements are the "functional equivalent" of
NEPA) (citation omitted); Alabamians For A Clean Env't v. Thomas, 18 ENVrL L
REP. 20460, 20462 (D. Ala. 1987) (holding NEPA inapplicable where RCRA require-
ments are the "functional equivalent" of NEPA); Alabama v. EPA, 91'1 F.2d 499, 505
(11th Cir. 1990) (holding that RCRA supersedes NEPA because it was enacted after
NEPA and provides more specific procedural guidelines to be followed by the EPA);
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So, what other criteria must be considered when NEPA is being ap-
plied to a legislative proposal? First, the courts recognize that an agency
decision not to act does not trigger NEPA's EIS requirement.' This
view is in line with the APA requirement for finality in agency decisions
before judicial review may occur.2 Second, congressional intent re-
flects a clear desire that recommendations or reports be supported by an
EIS "at the time the initial legislative proposals were made."'
The question of when to prepare a legislative EIS becomes one of
timing. Should an agency prepare an EIS once it completes a draft for a
proposal? "Mere contemplation" of a project is not enough to classify as
a proposal for major federal action.' But if the agency completes a
proposal and initiates action by publishing a proposal and holding hear-
ings, then an EIS should accompany that proposal. 7
The Ninth Circuit has determined that an EIS must be prepared before
"an irretrievable commitment of resources" occurs." What if the agen-
cy first makes the proposal to the President who then turns it over un-
changed to Congress? It is here that the courts have consistently shown
an unwillingness to require the Executive to prepare an EIS for legisla-
tive proposals.'
Schalk v. EPA, 10 ENVTL L. REP. 20381, 20382 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (holding that citizen
suit provision available for CERCLA does not give plaintiff the right to assert a
NEPA failure to prepare an EIS claim).
263. See, e.g., Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 477, (holding that Secretary of State's
decision not to exercise his power does not trigger NEPA's EIS requirement), vacated
in part, 439 U.S. 922 (1978).
264. See infra notes 270-85 and accompanying text (discussing NEPA standing under
the APA).
265. Wingfield v. OMB, 7 ENvrL L REP. 20362 (D.C. 1977) (denying injunctive relief
in connection with transmittal of federal agency reports and recommendations to
Congress on pending mining legislation) (emphasis added).
266. Kieppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 404 (1976).
267. Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce-
dures (S.C.R.A.P.), 422 U.S. 289, 320 (1975).
268. Conner v. Burford, 836 F.2d 1521, 1532 (9th Cir. 1988).
269. See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 361 (1979) (holding that requests for
appropriations do not require a legislative EIS because of their limited and specific
purpose); Chamber of Commerce of United States v. Dept. of Interior, 439 F. Supp
762, 766 (D.D.C. 1977) (depriving the public of the opportunity to participate in the
decision-making process is not sufficient grounds for standing when a proposal is
already in the hands of Congress because Congress can, at that point, require agency
preparation of an EIS or refuse to consider the proposal).
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2. Standing
NEPA does not provide a private right of action for damages or
restitution." Although the originally proposed language in NEPA stated
that "each person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful
environment," this constitution-like language was later softened to read
"each person should enjoy a healthful environment."27"' The fact that no
other part of NEPA explicitly references any individual rights of action
has led the courts to conclude that, by itself, NEPA does not embrace a
private right of action.2" NEPA has also been characterized as a supple-
mental statute. As a result, the standing requirements under NEPA de-
pend on which other statute the plaintiff is bringing his action under.
Section 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides: "Agency
action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which
there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial re-
view."2 7 Since NEPA has no statutory private right of action, plaintiffs
must rely on the APA to satisfy the standing requirement. 4 Review of
NEPA under the APA cannot serve as basis for substantial revision of
carefully constructed rule-making procedural specifications of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.275 This means that judicial review of
agencies' failure to comply with NEPA's provisions must first satisfy
APA's statutory requirements of "final agency action."27
The finality requirement under the APA serves to insure that review
involves concrete injury or threatened injury rather than hypothetical
effects of agency actions.277 Agency inaction can be considered "final
270. Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307, 1315 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Noe v.
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 644 F.2d 434, 439 (5th Cir. 1981) (conclud-
ing that there is no legislative intent to grant a private remedy under NEPA). But see
Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Ry. v. Callaway, 431 F. Supp. 722, 728 (D.D.C. 1977)
(concluding that NEPA's EIS requirement can be enforced by private action);
ANDERSON & DANIELS, supra note 16, at 16-23 (private parties have a right to enforce
adequate preparation of an EIS for "major federal actions").
271. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L No. 91-190, 1969
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2751, 2768-69.
272. Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 538 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (holding
that NEPA does not create any "substantive" rights).
273. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1993).
274. Since NEPA has been interpreted as an essentially a procedural statute, review
of its EIS requirement is principally achieved through the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D)
(1993).
275. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1988);
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1993).
276. Before undertaking judicial review, courts require that the challenged action is
"definitive" and has a direct impact on the challenger. Chicago Truck Drivers v. Na-
tional Mediation Bd., 670 F.2d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 1981).
277. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Goldschmidt, 677 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1982); Abbott
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agency action" subject to judicial review "so long as it continues and so
long as there is a vestige of a right which will suffer further impairment
by an extension of the delay," and it amounts to violation of a legal right
within the Federal Administrative Agency Act.278
In addition to the finality requirement, a prima facia challenge to an
agency violation of NEPA's EIS requirements under the APA requires that
the plaintiff "show that it was aggrieved by an agency action, the chal-
lenged action caused it an 'injury-in-fact', and the alleged injury was to
an interest 'arguably within the zone of interest to be protected or
regulated' by [NEPA]."2"
In National Wildlife Federation, the Supreme Court reviewed a chal-
lenge against the Bureau of Land Management (part of the Department of
Interior) alleging a violation of NEPA.' The Court refused to recognize
standing, reasoning that a general government "program" does not qualify
as "agency action" within the meaning of the APA." Standing in general
requires that the plaintiff "identify [a] particular 'agency action' that was
the source of [its] injuries," and plaintiffs affidavit in this case failed to
convince the Court that it did so with sufficient specificity.' The
courts reject "informational standing" without more because, as one
court put it, accepting such a standard for standing under NEPA "would
potentially eliminate any standing requirement in NEPA cases, save when
an organization was foolish enough to allege it wanted the information
for reasons having nothing to do with the environment."' Instead,
courts prefer that plaintiffs prove "the creation of a risk that serious
environmental impacts will be overlooked" to establish an injury suffi-
cient to satisfy standing.' Under this analysis, the mere failure to pre-
Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149-50 (1967).
278. Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856, 865 (4th Cir. 1961).
279. VALERIE M. FOGLEMAN, GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, IN-
TERPRETATIONS, APPLICATIONS, AND COMPLIANCE 171 (1990) (citing Sierra Club v. Mor-
ton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972)).
280. 497 U.S. 871 (1990), vacated, Mountain States Legal Found. v. National Wildlife
Fed'n, 497 U.S. 1020 (1990).
281. Id. at 899.
282. Id.
283. Foundation On Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see
also Foundation On Economic Trends v. Watkins, 794 F. Supp. 395, 398 (D.D.C. 1992)
(equating informational standing to the "ideological interest" in the global warming
problem and concluding that both are insufficient for standing).
284. City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 670-71 (9th Cir. 1975) (identifying such
a risk of serious environmental impact as sufficient procedural injury to satisfy stand-
ing requirements).
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pare an EIS is insufficient, absent "identifiable substantive agency action
putting the parties at risk."'
VI. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NEPA
The issue of NEPA's applicability to extraterritorial agency actions has
yet to be directly addressed by the courts and there are very few deci-
sions even dealing with the issue. In National Resources Defense Council
v. Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner, (NDRC) the D.C. Circuit consid-
ered whether the export of a nuclear reactor to the Philippines triggered
the EIS requirement, even though the potential environmental impact
would fall exclusively within the territory of the Philippines.'
The NRDC court held that NEPA did not apply to nuclear licensing
exports, making it clear, however, that its holding did not preclude appli-
cability of NEPA to other potential federal actions abroad." The court
reasoned that the NEPA "looks toward cooperation, not unilateral action"
and that Congress should not impose its national environmental goals on
other countries.'
The court also wrestled with the issue of whether to interpret NEPA
as applying extraterritorially to the U.S. Army's activities in Germany in
Greenpeace USA v. Stone.' While the court recognized Congress' con-
cern with the "worldwide environment," it also pointed out that NEPA
does not explicitly call for extraterritorial application.'m The court then
evaluated the Army's decision not to prepare an EIS in light of the re-
quirements of Executive Order 12114,91 concluding that the Army suffi-
ciently complied with the Order.'
285. Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (relying on language in Lyng, 943 F.2d at 85).
286. Natural Resources Defense Couns., Inc. v. Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345,
1366-67 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
287. Id. at 1367-68.
288. Id. at 1366. Of course, this argument will not apply when the other country
has openly adopted the NEPA's EIS requirement as their own or where the imposi-
tion of NEPA's EIS requirement falls on a United States agency, i.e. the OTR, not on
another sovereign.
289. Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990) (denying injunction
of transportation of American Army's nerve gas stockpile from Germany to the
Johnston Atoll where the transfer was part of an agreement between the President of
the United States and a foreign head-of-state and the Army had already substantially
complied with Executive Order 12114 in preparing an EIS); see also Natural Resourc-
es, 647 F.2d at 1367.
290. Greenpeace USA, 748 F. Supp. at 757.
291. Id. For a discussion of Executive Order 12114, see supra notes 213-19.
292. See Greenpeace USA, 748 F. Supp at 762. But see EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1229 (1991) (ruling that NEPA does not apply extraterritorially
and that non-compliance with Executive Order 12114 does not create a right of ac-
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A. Recent Legislative Attempts to Clarify NEPA's Extraterritorial
Mandate
In 1989, House Representative Studds introduced a bill for
reauthorization of the CEQ, including a clarification that NEPA apply
extraterritorially.2 0 According to Mr. Studds, the purpose of the bill was
twofold.' First, it "makes it absolutely, 100 percent clear, that NEPA
applies... to major federal actions having a significant environmental
impact on the atmosphere, the oceans, Antarctica, and other areas that
commonly make up what is commonly referred to as the global com-
mons."" Second, it requires Federal agencies to consider the environ-
mental impact of their actions on climate change, ozone depletion,
transboundary pollution and other global problems.' On March 5, 1991,
Mr. Studds presented yet another bill in the House of Representatives
calling for the extraterritorial application of NEPA.' 7 The section on
NEPA's extraterritorial application was ultimately stricken from the final
version of the bill.'
In 1987, the Senate also presented a similar bill calling for the extrater-
ritorial application of NEPA.' Although the bill included certain ex-
emptions from the extraterritorial application of NEPA, international
tion); Conservation Law Found. v. Clark, 590 F. Supp. 1467, 1477-78 (D. Mass. 1984)
(holding that Executive Order in furtherance of NEPA did not create private right of
action).
293. H.R. 1113, 101st Cong., Ist. Sess., 135 CONG. REc. H6836 (daily ed. Oct. 10,
1989).
294. 135 CONG. REC. H6836-37 (1989) (statements of Rep. Studds).
295. Id. at 6837.
296. Id.
297. 137 CONG. REC. H1413-15 (Mar. 45, 1991). Michael Deland, then Chairman of
the CEQ, was present at the subcommittee hearings and expressed that the
administration's view was that the extraterritorial application of NEPA "should be
implemented by amending the existing executive order rather than legislatively." H.R.
REP. No. 1092, 102d Cong. (1992).
298. H.R. REP. No. 553, 102d Cong. 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1-3 (1992).
299. S. REP. No. 180, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., (1991). The Senate bill 1278 was differ-
ent in that, unlike the House bill, it exempted certain federal activities from NEPA's
extraterritorial application and gave the President authority to exempt other actions
on a case-by-case basis The list of specific exemptions included actions "taken to
protect the national security of the U.S.; Those taken in the course of an armed con-
flict; Votes in international conferences or organizations; Strategic intelligence activ-
ities; Armaments transfers; and Judicial or administrative civil or criminal enforcement
actions." Id. at 4. i
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trade agreements were not among them. 0 The bill emphasized the na-
ture of NEPA's global scope by requiring "consideration of local, region-
al, and global environmental impacts" regardless of geographical loca-
tion.3°"
The Conference Report attached to the bill explained the inadequacy
of Executive Order 12114 as unenforceable, lacking "many important
features of NEPA and the implementing regulations, including provisions
for public participation." The most important of the missing features
in Executive Order 12114 was its lack of a right of private action.' The
report also cites the CEQ's own conclusions, after a 1987 study of this
Executive Order, that agency interpretations of the Order were inconsis-
tent when they were followed at all.'
Additionally the report criticizes the Supreme Court decision of Rob-
ertson v. Methow Va//ey as a "narrow interpretation of NEPAs substan-
tive duties and procedural requirements contrary to the overall objectives
of the Act." The Robertson decision held that NEPA does not impose
upon agencies a substantive duty to mitigate environmental effects or to
fully develop mitigation plans in each EIS. "' In contrast, Congress re-
sponded that NEPA is to be "construed broadly" so as to improve weak
agency compliance with respect to actions that affect global climate,
ozone depletion, transboundary pollution, deforestation, biological diver-
sity, desertification, and overpopulation. 7
Another bill was presented in the House of Representatives in 1993, to
extend NEPAs reach to extraterritorial actions, specifically calling for
NEPAs application to bilateral and multilateral agreements.' Congres-
sional members concerned about the court's reluctance to interpret
NEPA as applying to international actions introduced the bill to clarify
that "actions covered by NEPA would include the President's submission
to Congress of implementing legislation for trade agreements. " ' Mem-
300. Id.
301. Id. at 2.
302. Id. at 3; see also supra notes 211-217 and accompanying text (discussing Exec-
utive Order 12114).
303. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 530 (D.D.C.
1993) (holding that Executive Order 12114 does not create a private cause of action
for failure to prepare an EIS on actions abroad).
304. S. REP. No. 180, supra note 296, at 3.
305. Id. at 5.
306. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizen's Council, 490 U.S. 332, 353 (1989).
307. See S. REP. No. 180, supra note 298, at 5.
308. 139 CONG. REC. E2342, (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1993). The bill emphasized that
"NEPA's strength lies in its democratization of federal administrative law [by) empow-
er~ing] citizens with the information they need to meaningfully contribute to the envi-
ronmental decisionmaking process." Id.
309. Id. "Bilateral and multilateral trade agreements inevitably have environmental
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bers proposing the bill explained that the Executive Branch may sidestep
NEPAs requirements "every time that the President has final Constitu-
tional or statutory responsibility for the final step" of presenting a federal
action to Congress."' This bill would have granted a private right to sue
the President or his executive office whenever they fail to provide an EIS
along with legislative proposals for international agreements.3"' The bill
did not become law.
Ironically, a different bill passed in 1989, requiring multilateral develop-
ment banks to refuse funding unless requesting projects were in compli-
ance with the EIS requirement. 2 As the proponents of amending NEPA
asked: "How can we insist that multilateral banks prepare impact assess-
ments on foreign projects when we fail to require our own [OTRI to
prepare environmental impact statements[?]"3"3
B. Public Citizen: The Latest Attempt to Resolve the Issue of NEPA's
Extraterritorial Application Through the Courts
The latest attempt by a citizen group to apply NEPA's EIS requirement
to extraterritorial action was the suit brought by Public Citizen against
the United States Trade Representative for failure to prepare a legislative
EIS in conjunction with its proposal for the North American Free Trade
Agreement."4 As discussed, NEPA does not have a citizen suit provi-
sion,3 ' therefore Public Citizen had to rely on the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA). 6 to bring the NEPA lawsuit against OTR 7 By doing
consequences which must be thoroughly examined prior to their approval. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. Proponents of the bill explained that the U.S. Trade Representative
(U.S.T.R.) could easily make the preparation of an EIS part of its negotiating process
as other federal agencies have already done. Id.
312. International Development and Finance Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 240, § 521,
103 Stat 2511 (1989) (signed into law by President Bush).
313. See 139 CONG. REC. E2342 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1995) (statement of Rep. Owens)
314. See Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 970 F.2d
916, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
315. See Sierra Club v. Penfeld, 857 F.2d 1307, 1315 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Noe, v.
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 644 F.2d 434, 438 (5th Cir. 1981). But see
Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. v. Callaway, 431 F. Supp. 722, 438 (D.D.C. 1977).
316. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, a private party may sue for injunctive
relief if they are "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the mean-
ing of a relevant statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1993).
317. Public Citizen, 970 F.2d at 918 ("NEPA does not create a private right of
action, so plaintiffs rest their claim" on the APA).
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so, plaintiffs had to comply with the APA's requirements for standing,
mainly, that the agency action subject to review must be "final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.""8
The District Court for the District of Columbia held that Public Citizen
did not satisfy the standing requirements under the APA because OTR's
ongoing preparation of NAF TA was not final action."' Once NAFTA
was finalized and signed, Public Citizen brought suit again and this time
the district court granted plaintiffs summary judgment, ordering OTR to
prepare an EIS on NAFTA. 0 However, Public Citizen's victory proved
to be short-lived.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals reasoned that submis-
sion of NAFTA to the President was not final because the President has
the power "to renegotiate NAFrA before submitting it to Congress or to
refuse to submit it at all... [therefore] his action, and not that of the
OTR, will directly affect Public Citizen's members.""2 Accordingly, the
court concluded that NAFTA's legislative proposal to Congress is not re-
viewable under the APA because the President will present it, and he is
not an agency subject to NEPA's procedural requirements. In reaching
this decision, the court looked at the recent Supreme Court case of
Franklin v. Massachusetts.'
In Franklin, the Court reasoned that a census count was not a "final
agency action" under the APA because the Secretary's report to the Pres-
ident "serves more like a tentative recommendation than a final and
binding determination." 4 The Court further reasoned that "[b]ecause it
is the President's personal transmittal to Congress that settles the appor-
318. Id.
319. Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 782 F. Supp.
139 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing and noting additional problems
with finality of the action), affd, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that Court
had no jurisdiction because ongoing NAFrA negotiations did not constitute "final
agency action" under the APA).
320. Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.C. Cir.
1993), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The U.S. District Court stated that "the plain
language of the NEPA makes it a foregone conclusion that the OTR must prepare an
EIS on the NAFTA." Id. at 29.
321. Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 553 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
322. Id.; see a/so Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding
that the President is not an agency within the meaning of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act), rv'd, 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
323. 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992). The Franklin decision reversed a lower court holding
that directed the Secretary of State to eliminate overseas federal employees from
census counts used to apportion the number of representatives to Congress, and
ordered a recount. Id. at 2770.
324. Id. at 2774.
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tionment, until he acts there is no determinate agency action to chal-
lenge. The President, not the Secretary, takes the final action that affects
the States."'
The Court distinguished Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean
Society, "in which [the Court] held that the Secretary of Commerce's
certification to the President that another country was endangering fish-
eries was 'final agency action.'""2 According to the Court, the difference
in Japan Whaling was that the Secretary's action "automatically trig-
gered sanctions," as opposed to the Franklin report to the President,
which had "no direct effect on reapportionment."'
Public Citizen believed that the OTR is still legally required to prepare
a legislative EIS on NAFTA, notwithstanding the jurisprudential challeng-
es that prevented the case from being tried on the merits.' In October
of 1993, the group filed a petition for certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court.' In the interim, Public Citizen stated that "the court of
appeals disregarded more than two decades of NEPA jurisprudence,
executive branch practice, and congressional understanding."'m The
group further criticized the decision, stating that it effectively renders
NEPA's EIS requirement unenforceable.' The Supreme Court refused
to review the case.'
It is the view of the author that Public Citizen was erroneously decid-
ed. First, NEPA's EIS mandate to prepare an EIS for any federal action
that has a substantial impact on the environment is to all federal agen-
cies; Congress did not provide an exemption for the OTR.m Second, the
CEQ regulations expressly mention that treaties and international agree-
ments are federal actions.' These regulations are subject to substantial
325. Id. at 2775.
326. Id. at 2774 (citing Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S.
221, 231 (1986)).
327. Id.
328. Public Citizen News Conference, FED. NEWS SERV., Sept. 24, 1993.
329. 10 I.T.R. 1716 (Oct. 13, 1993).
330. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
331. See also Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 553
(D.C. Cir. 1993). (Public Citizen brief at 43).
332. Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994); see
also Supreme Court Refuses to Review Case on Whether EIS Required For Trade
Deal, I.T.R. (BNA) 60 (1994).
333. See Comment, Nepa's Role In Protecting The World Environment, 131 U. PA.
L REV. 353, 361 n.53 (1982).
334. See supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
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deference by the courts, and therefore, they should apply as authority
that international agreements are subject to NEPA's EIS requirement.'
Third, the court of appeals erred in finding that OTR's NAFTA recom-
mendation to the President did not represent "final agency action." As
Judge Randolph correctly pointed out in his concurring opinion, "judicial
review under the APA demands 'final agency action' whereas the duty to
prepare an impact statement arises earlier. " ' The court erroneously
concluded that when OTR presented the completed and signed NAFTA
to the President, there was no final agency action reviewable by the
court."7 Furthermore, the President's signature and subsequent recom-
mendation of NAFTA for legislative proposal created a generally accept-
ed "obligation of good faith to refrain from acts calculated to frustrate
the object of the treaty [which] attaches to a State which has signed a
treaty subject to ratification."'m Fourth, NEPA's application to interna-
tional trade agreements would not infringe on the President's constitu-
tional powers, nor would it offend the international principles of comity
and territorial sovereignty." On the contrary, it would both help the
335. See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 355 (1989).
336. See Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 554 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (Randolph, J., concurring). Judge Randolph also commented on the need to
reconcile Franklin with a prior Supreme Court case requiring court intervention
"when a proposal or recommendation is made, and someone protests either the ab-
sence or the adequacy of the final impact statement." Id. (quoting Kieppe v. Sierra
Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 n.15 (1976)). The EIS requirement is triggered when the OTR
makes its NAFTA recommendations to the President, not when the President later
proposes those recommendations to Congress. See Nevada v. Watkins, 939 F.2d 710,
713 n.8 (1991).
337. Other agencies reporting and making recommendations to the President are
currently required to prepare an EIS prior to making such recommendations. See,
e.g., Watkins, 939 F.2d at 713 n.8 (stating that Secretary of the Department of
Energy's recommendation to the President regarding nuclear waste sites is clearly
reviewable pursuant to the APA "as a final decision or action by the Secretary" de-
spite the fact that the President makes the final recommendation to Congress).
338. Michael J. Glennon, The Senate Role in Treaty Ratification, 77 A.J.I.L 257, 275
n.111 (1983) (quoting reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/6309/Rev.1 (1966), reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT'L L COMM'N 70, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l).
339. In fact, the President himself has previously been subject to preparation of an
environmental impact report requiring him, according to the Jackson amendment, to
"examine alternative potential basing modes and alternative weapons systems" to the
infamous MX missile. See Romer v. Carlucci, 847 F.2d 445, 452 (8th Cir. 1988) (fur-
ther holding that Air Force's EIS compliance with NEPA is fully reviewable despite
the fact that MX EIS decisions are "interwoven with political issues going to the
heart of foreign policy and national defense which have been already resolved by the
President"). Id. at 461. See generally Department of Defense Authorization Act of
1984, Pub. L No. 98-94, § 110, 97 Stat. 614, 621-22 (1983) (DAA 1984); 96 Stat. 1830,
1846 (Jackson Amendment). But see National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nu-
clear Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding that foreign
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President in making better recommendations to Congress, and help other
nations that lack the resources and technology to conduct as thorough
an EIS as the United States is capable of generating. Finally, the
American public has a right to participate in the process of entering into
international trade agreements that, as discussed, have a tremendous
impact on the earth's environment and its resources.'
VII. CONCLUSION
Economic development is inextricably linked to the environmental
health of our planet to the extent that most industries are dependent on
natural resources in one way or another. Our failure to account for the
real value of such shrinking resources could lead to economic conse-
quences that could destabilize order in many regions of the world. The
application of NEPAs EIS requirement to trade agreements would result
in greater public participation, the dissemination of full and accurate
information, and better decision-making.
Despite this, the court in Public Citizen was unwilling to expand
NEPA's mandate by interpreting its scope to include both procedural and
substantive requirements or by enforcing executive agency compliance
with what has now become an international practice, the EIS. The Exec-
utive Branch, in an effort to bypass the rigorous evaluation required by
NEPA's EIS, and to speed up passage of NAFMA, resisted the preparation
of an EIS on the agreement despite environmentally-sensitive Al Gore's
statements that a federal agency could easily prepare one.
Congress must enact new legislation that puts teeth into NEPA and
resolves the ambiguities surrounding the statute. Legislators must amend
NEPA to: (a) create a citizen suit provision and (b) clarify NEPA's scope
to apply to all federal agency actions, including trade agreements and
other extraterritorial actions. While implementation of these proposed
provisions into NEPA will not solve the environmental challenges we
face, it would certainly represent a step in the right direction.
JOSE A. EGURBIDE
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policy concerns regarding nuclear exports supersede NEPA's EIS requirement).
340. See supra note 308 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 46-62 and
accompanying text (discussing the role of the public in shaping environmental policy).

